

Division Battle Staff Requirements for
Sustained Peace Enforcement Operations

A Monograph
By
Major Kathleen A. Gavle
United States Army

School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

First Term, AY 99-00

Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 4

20000919 122

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

Major Kathleen A. Gavle

Title of Monograph: Division Battle Staff Requirements for Sustained Peace
Enforcement Operations

Approved by:

LTC Peter J. Schifferle, MA, MMAS

Monograph Director

Robert H. Berlin, Ph.D

Professor and Director, Academic
Affairs, School of Advanced Military Studies

Philip J. Brooks, Ph.D

Director, Graduate Degree Program

Accepted this 17th Day of December 1999

ABSTRACT

DIVISION BATTLE STAFF REQUIREMENTS FOR SUSTAINED PEACE ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS by MAJ Kathleen A. Gavle, USA, 41 pages.

In December 1995, the Dayton Peace Accords led to a US Army deployment to Bosnia for participation in a complex, multinational peace enforcement mission, Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR. The 1st Armor Division led the first US force, Task Force Eagle, to occupy Multinational Division North, and three other divisions have since served as the nucleus of Task Force Eagle. This monograph examines the division battle staff in light of the experiences in Bosnia to assess whether the traditional battle staff structures and operations meet the demands of a peace enforcement operation.

The monograph sets the stage for this examination by establishing the combat battle staff as the baseline for comparison and then describing the operational environment for peace enforcement. With this background, the monograph analyzes three specific aspects of the division battle staff experiences in Bosnia: staff functions, structures, and procedures. Three criteria measure staff effectiveness in coordinating or facilitating the division's response to the demands of the peace enforcement operational environment. One is the ability to eliminate hostilities and enforce a peace agreement. Second is the ability to deal with civilians, including local government and law enforcement, non-governmental organizations (NGO), and the media. Last is the ability to assess progress towards accomplishing military tasks that support the political end-state. The result of this analysis is an identification of key players, structures, and procedures to conduct peace enforcement operations.

The fundamental requirements for the planning staff in peace enforcement operations are the same as those for the battle staff in a combat operation, but there are some significant refinements. The planning process still requires a chief planner, and feedback is still critical to drive and adapt the process. The military decision making process remains the best way to rationalize the work of the planners. The differences in the requirements for a peace enforcement planning staff derive from the environment and from the mission parameters. Instead of combat operations such as attack and defend, enforcement of a peace accord involves perceptions and persuasion. The long duration of the mission requires the division commander to look more strategically than the commander of a combat operation.

The division planning staff in this environment relies more on the subject matter expertise of "soft skill" officers—CA, PSYOP, IO, POLAD—for input into the planning process and for course of action options. Although some of the structures that emerged from TFE were specifically focused on the Balkan region and the GFAP demands, several are readily adaptable to other peace enforcement operations. Finally, while the basics of division staff operations depend on the procedures that are familiar to those with a combat orientation, there are differences in the lead players and the dynamics.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
Introduction.....	1
I. Combat Battle Staff.....	3
II. The Peace Enforcement Operational Environment.....	8
III. Planning Staff Functions for a Peace Enforcement Operation.....	13
IV. Planning Staff Structures for a Peace Enforcement Operation.....	21
V. Planning Staff Procedures for a Peace Enforcement Operation.....	31
Conclusion.....	39
Endnotes.....	42
Bibliography.....	58

INTRODUCTION

The end of the Cold War and the expulsion of Saddam Hussein from Kuwait seemed to vindicate the US Army's post-Vietnam organization and training. The American presence and vigilance around the world protected US national security interests. By the mid-1990s, combat with the Warsaw Pact on the plains of Europe no longer dominated US national security and military strategy, but the new decade held other challenges for the United States and its Army. In addition to maintaining its capability to fight conventional wars, the US Army became involved in highly visible stability and support operations (SASO) that included humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and peacekeeping.¹

In December 1995, the Dayton Peace Accords led to a US Army deployment to Bosnia for participation in a complex, multinational peace enforcement mission, Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR. The 1st Armor Division led the first US force, Task Force Eagle, to occupy Multinational Division North. Since then, three other divisions have served as the nucleus of Task Force Eagle for the follow-on Operations JOINT GUARD and JOINT FORGE. They have captured lessons and drawn conclusions about planning and conducting stability and support operations. This monograph examines the division battle staff in light of the experiences in Bosnia to assess whether the traditional battle staff structures and operations meet the demands of peace enforcement.²

The monograph begins by setting the stage for this examination. Initially, it outlines the traditional division battle staff positions, functions, and tasks and discusses the organization of various cells to facilitate combat operations. The combat battle staff is the baseline against which the monograph assesses the peace enforcement staff. A

description of the operational environment for peace enforcement follows, highlighting how it differs from combat. The operational environment includes the command structures, threats, and tasks that existed during each division's deployment.

Once the background is established for comparing the two staffs, the monograph analyzes specific aspects of the division battle staff experiences in Bosnia. First is an examination of staff functions, defined as a particular staff officer or role. Three criteria measure staff effectiveness in coordinating and facilitating the division's response to the demands of the peace enforcement operational environment. One is the ability to eliminate hostilities and enforce a peace agreement. Second is the ability to deal with civilians, including local government and law enforcement, non-governmental organizations (NGO), and the media. Last is the ability to assess progress towards accomplishing military tasks that support the political end-state. The result of this analysis is an identification of key players on the division battle staff to conduct peace enforcement operations.

The next aspect examined is the creation of battle staff structures. Structures refer to the organizations that the staff used to plan operations or to accomplish specific tasks. Since 1995, Task Force Eagle battle staffs created and adapted unique structures to facilitate their mission accomplishment. The monograph applies all three staff effectiveness criteria to these structures to determine those that were most effective for the operational environment.

The final aspect of division battle staff experience the monograph investigates is procedures. Procedures refer to the actions the staffs took to accomplish their missions--the tactics, techniques, and procedures that defined their operations. Task Force Eagle

staffs did not completely discard traditional battle staff procedures, but the operational requirements led to the development and creative application of different procedures. The assessment of these procedures against the three criteria indicates those most useful for peace enforcement operations.

The United States National Command Authorities (NCA) has committed the US Army to at least another three years in Bosnia. Additionally, it has deployed soldiers for a long-term commitment in Kosovo.³ Since the Army can expect to participate in similar operations in the future, it should prepare division staffs to be efficient and proficient in conducting such operations. Three divisions' approaches to peace enforcement operations in the Balkans can provide lessons and models for the next divisions that assume the role of headquarters for Task Force Eagle and other SASO in the near future.

Chapter 1

THE COMBAT BATTLE STAFF

Staffs at all echelons exist to assist the commander in accomplishing his mission, providing information to help him make and execute decisions. The staff manages information for the commander and provides him with situational awareness, an understanding of the battlefield.⁴ FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations, is the US Army's doctrine for staff operations. It offers a common understanding of how to conduct staff functions across all Army tactical units. As the doctrinal source for the military decision-making process, FM 101-5 is also a key reference for a division staff's efforts to analyze and present information to the commander.⁵

Planning is a distinct function for the division and is the purview of the division battle staff. Doctrine identifies a coordinating staff group, a special staff, and a personal staff; it does not mention a battle staff. Battle staff is not a term found in doctrine, but it is generally understood to comprise those officers and noncommissioned officers that participate in the division's planning process.⁶ Battle staff tasks include preparing estimates; planning, integrating, coordinating, and synchronizing operations; parallel planning to facilitate the transition from current to future operations; providing recommendations for decisions; and monitoring current operations to gauge resources for future plans.⁷ The battle staff plans the operations, and a separate current operations staff executes them. The battle staff, then, works to provide the commander with an understanding of the situation, the mission, and the options available to him. Although the term is absent, doctrine does provide guidelines for the common functions, organizations, and procedures for division battle staffs.

The division has only one plans section, residing in its main command post and comprised of representatives from each battlefield operating system. Some units call their planning team a battle staff; others simply refer to it as a planning cell or group.⁸ Members of the division battle staff are usually the assistant division staff officers within each battlefield operating system or the officer one rank down from the primary staff officer. Key participants for combat operations tend to be the "killers": the G3 planner as the lead maneuver representative, the Deputy Fire Support Coordinator, and the Air Liaison Officer, for example.⁹ The G2 planner and his team of analysts, order of battle technician, terrain technician, and staff weather officer always have a significant role, since their products drive the battle staff's understanding of the enemy, weather, and

terrain. The engineer provides critical input for most combat operations, whether planning for a river crossing, an obstacle breach, or a division defense. The G4 planner determines the logistics requirements to support division operations, relying on input from the division transportation officer and the division support command (DISCOM). Other battlefield operating system representatives participate in the process, with the visibility of their input tied to the nature of the plan.

The division battle staff resides in the division main command post (CP) and becomes involved in several main CP organizations. Within this CP, doctrine describes three major elements: the command cell, the G3 (Operations) cell, and the G2 (Intelligence) cell. The plans cell, the nucleus of the division's battle staff, is part of the G3 cell. Other battle staff participants, many of them dual-hatted as planners and operators, come from the G2 cell and the other sections within the G3 cell. For example, the terrain technician and the staff weather officer provide key planning products as well as data to support the current fight. Order of battle expertise comes from the G2's Analysis and Control Element (ACE). The assistant division signal officer (ADSO) determines the communications requirements for future plans as he monitors the sustainment of the current architecture. Liaison officers work with the battle staff to exchange information, capture situational awareness and commander's intent for their parent unit, and facilitate parallel planning.¹⁰ The division deep operations coordination cell (DOCC) plans and conducts deep operations for the division using artillery, attack aviation, engineer, electronic warfare, and psychological operations assets. As discussed below, DOCC operations in Bosnia were very different from those in combat operations. Planners participate in the DOCC meetings to identify the friendly and enemy situations

expected for future operations. Finally, the battle staff transfers to current operations the responsibility for executing a plan and then, in conjunction with the current operations cell, monitors the battle for impacts on future operations.¹¹

Several procedures based on doctrine or experience assist battle staffs in conducting their operations. The military decision making process is the battle staff's fundamental doctrinal procedure that provides certain products to support the staff's planning efforts and the commander's decision making. It also ensures communications among participants.¹² Other procedures the battle staff relies on for combat operations include battle rhythm, targeting meetings or boards, and periodic huddles or updates.

Battle rhythm is another term with a common understanding but no doctrinal definition. Lieutenant Colonel Kamena, Senior Task Force Observer/Controller at the Combat Maneuver Training Center, suggests the following definition: battle rhythm is the combination and interaction of procedures, processes, leader and individual actions at soldier, staff section, command node, and unit levels to facilitate extended continuous operations.¹³ Establishing a battle rhythm helps the battle staff manage its time to obtain information and prepare products to support the commander's decisions. The battle rhythm centers around the decisions the commander must make.¹⁴ Components of the battle rhythm include commander updates, decision briefings, targeting boards, and shift changes. The division standing operating procedures (SOP) may specify its battle rhythm, but it could change with changes to the mission. The battle rhythm should facilitate routine operations, parallel planning, and decision-making.

The targeting meeting or board is another battle staff procedure that is integral to the planning process. It synchronizes key players and assists the division commander in

making decisions regarding scarce division resources to mass combat power. The D3A methodology--decide, detect, deliver, assess—drives the targeting process and usually sets the stage for each targeting meeting. The deputy fire support coordinator (DFSCOORD) chairs the meeting. He addresses future operations in terms of blocks of time, often twenty-four, forty-eight, and seventy-two hours away, to focus the process and commitment of resources.¹⁵ The planners' focus is beyond the next twenty-four hours. For these battles, the planners present the expected friendly and enemy situations to the rest of the staff to help develop their priorities and targeting options.

Periodic huddles or updates also facilitate battle staff operations. Examples of such updates include the commander's Battle Update Briefing (BUB), the staff update, the intelligence update, and the shift change briefing. While constant coordination helps maintain the common shared understanding and the unity of effort, battle staff huddles or meetings should not be ad hoc. They should be part of the division's battle rhythm and be interspersed with other required briefings and meetings. These additional huddles and updates should help sustain situational awareness and coordination, while not burdening the battle staff.

War fighting is the basis for the doctrine that guides battle staff operations.¹⁶ The staff's sole purpose is to facilitate the commander's decisions by analyzing and presenting information, planning operations, soliciting decisions, and managing time for those decisions in a high-paced combat environment. Short of going to war, battle staffs exercise their particular combat organizations and procedures through field exercises, staff drills and training center rotations. Just several weeks after the Berlin Wall began to crumble, the US Army conducted Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama. According to

General Carl Stiner, this operation validated the training and doctrine direction the US Army had taken. It also marked an important milestone in the US Army's shift away from implementing a strategy of containment to its participation in efforts to resolve less well-defined political disputes.¹⁷ It is with this background and experience that each division received a warning order to prepare to deploy for peace enforcement operations in Bosnia.

Chapter II

THE PEACE ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

Before delving into the details of division staff experiences in Bosnia, it is important to explain the environment in which Operations JOINT ENDEAVOR, JOINT GUARD, and JOINT FORGE have occurred. In conjunction with the established baseline of the combat battle staff, the operational environment completes setting the stage for an evaluation of the peace enforcement planning staff. Furthermore, the conditions of the operational environment lead to the criteria for this evaluation.¹⁸

US Army doctrine recognizes that the SASO operational environment is very different from the combat environment, particularly as SASO tends to occur in a complex and ambiguous political-military situation. SASO operations, furthermore, may require long-term commitments or deployments that experience several shifts in emphasis. The Army's participation in SASO missions is typically as part of a joint team, with multinational and combined operations becoming more common. Additionally, the Army works in conjunction with US and foreign governmental agencies and nongovernmental organizations.¹⁹

Within the framework of SASO, US Army doctrine distinguishes three general categories: support to diplomacy, which includes peace making, peace building, and preventive diplomacy; peacekeeping (PK); and peace enforcement (PE). US Army operations in Bosnia were and continue to be peace enforcement operations. Peace enforcement is distinguished by the application or threat of military force to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions, usually under an international authorization. Additionally, whereas consent is clear in PK, it is not absolute in PE. Units use force to compel compliance, not just for self-defense. Impartiality, essential to PK operations, is more difficult to maintain in PE operations.²⁰

The US Army's participation in the peace enforcement mission in Bosnia followed nearly four years of bloodshed and several unsuccessful attempts by the United Nations and European governments to resolve the conflict. Events during the summer and fall of 1995 shifted the regional balance of power and prompted the first viable ceasefire.²¹ Following weeks of negotiations in Ohio, the warring parties signed the Dayton Peace Accords in Paris on December 14, 1995.²²

NATO received a UN mandate to implement the military aspects of this peace accord, and the North Atlantic Council approved the deployment of a multinational Implementation Force (IFOR) to begin the alliance's largest military operation, Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR. Task Force Eagle (TFE), the US Army contingent, initially deployed as part of IFOR and continues to operate as part of the Stabilization Force (SFOR). SFOR's goal is to sustain and build on what IFOR accomplished in bringing peace to Bosnia. Both forces deployed under the provisions of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, which provides for peace enforcement operations.²³

Instead of planning for operations designed to win a war as a combat battle staff does, the planning staffs of TFE plan operations designed to implement peace in accordance with the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP).²⁴ US Army doctrine discusses some common tasks associated with peace enforcement operations, but the GFAP established IFOR's specific mission.²⁵ The military tasks identified by Annex 1A of the peace accord included ending hostilities, separating the armed forces of the warring parties, establishing and monitoring weapons storage sites, and overseeing the withdrawal of all foreign forces.²⁶ In practice, this meant soldiers were conducting patrols, establishing checkpoints, removing illegal checkpoints, and conducting weapons storage site inspections. TFE units also established base camp security and other force protection measures.²⁷ The requirement to enforce peace and compel compliance meant that some operations were essentially combat operations, but most were not.

By April 1996, the last GFAP deadline, the parties were generally in compliance with the military provisions of the GFAP, despite some violations. However, there were key failures in the peace process that ultimately led to an extended commitment of US forces. With the end of the IFOR mandate on December 20, 1996, TFE units became part of SFOR.²⁸ SFOR continues to deter renewed hostilities, building on the lessons of IFOR. In addition, within its abilities, SFOR accomplishes tasks to assist the civilian agencies, such as providing a secure environment for elections, monitoring ICTY activity, bringing war criminals to justice, and returning refugees to their homes.²⁹ As battalions conduct routine operations to implement the GFAP, the division planning staff develops other plans for operations that are not routine—the take down of a radio tower

whose operators are hostile to NATO, the detention of a suspected war criminal, violence in the wake of the Breko decision—and that result from noncompliance or belligerence.³⁰

In addition to facilitating the enforcement of a peace accord, the division planning staff in Bosnia facilitates operations with civilians. The combat battle staff structure assumes the need to deal with civilians by the inclusion of a G5, the civil-military operations officer, who advises the commander on the impact of the civilian population on military operations and vice versa.³¹ In peace enforcement operations, though, the civilian aspect is much more demanding. The objective is to restore civil order, civilian infrastructure, and public services, so the civil aspect assumes a greater part of the planning staff's focus. Military operations help restore order, and continued enforcement of the peace accord provides the secure environment for a multitude of civil agencies to rebuild the country. US Army doctrine expects Army forces operating in the complex civil-military environment associated with peace enforcement operations to interact with a variety of civilian agencies, soliciting their expertise and cooperation.³²

The variety of civilian actors in Bosnia is an important aspect of the operation; soldiers do not work in an exclusively US Army environment. Among the agencies offering expertise and cooperation are the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the International Police Task Force (IPTF), and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY).³³ The residents of Bosnia are additional actors. Bosnia witnessed massive population shifts during the conflict, stemming from combat and from ethnic cleansing. There are now many displaced persons and refugees that soldiers encounter. As IFOR was transitioning to SFOR, there was a trend towards more

confrontations—riots and demonstrations—among civilian groups. Freedom of movement and resettlement, in particular, were catalysts for hostilities, and although responsibility for law and order rests with local civilian agencies, TFE is required to respond to deliberate violence.³⁴ Additionally, many local residents work at the US base camps as interpreters or contractors. Persons indicted for war crimes (PIFWC), whether military or civilian, are also important players in the operational environment. Finally, most operations occur under the scrutiny of the American, international, and local media, each with different perspectives and agendas.

The last critical aspect of the peace enforcement operational environment is the strategic objective it seeks to obtain. In war, the translation of strategic objectives into operational objectives tends to be finite and typically happens at echelons above division. In peace enforcement operations, political decisions impact a division's daily operations, tactical decisions influence policy, and commanders use military capabilities to shape the political-military environment.³⁵ This requires the division planning staff to continually assess the unit's progress towards accomplishing the political end state. Basic goals of peace enforcement include containing the conflict and obtaining agreement to a negotiated settlement that resolves the basis for conflict and sets the conditions for lasting peace. Military forces either achieve an end state or set of conditions that accomplishes the strategic objective or they pass the main effort to other instruments of national power.³⁶ The division will not necessarily be given a clear statement of its end state, but planners must understand the desired military end state to be achieved as part of the overall strategy.³⁷ Determining the military end state and ensuring it is consistent with national objectives are the critical initial steps in the planning process. In an operation

like Bosnia, with an operational environment that includes a dislocated population, a destroyed infrastructure, a struggling economy, the competing interests of three ethnic groups, and NATO and non-NATO members as participants, that requires continual mission analysis.³⁸

The planning staff working in a peace enforcement environment must facilitate the division's accomplishment of several missions that are very different from those in a combat environment. In an environment of multinational military and civilian players, the planning staff coordinates and synchronizes division operations to enforce compliance with the peace agreement and to facilitate its civil aspects. Additionally, the staff should periodically assess its progress towards fully accomplishing the military tasks or setting the conditions that support the political end state. Meanwhile, the staff must still provide information for the commander to make decisions and for subordinate units to execute operations. Measures of staff effectiveness will determine which functions, organizations, and procedures were most useful in helping Task Force Eagle planning staffs accomplish their missions in Bosnia.

Chapter III

PLANNING STAFF FUNCTIONS FOR A PEACE ENFORCEMENT OPERATION

Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR was a "military mission with a civil end state—restoration of the Bosnian government, institutions, infrastructure, and economy."³⁹ The military forces were deployed to provide a stable environment to facilitate this restoration, and SFOR continues to do so.⁴⁰ The complexity of the peace enforcement environment in Bosnia and the peculiarities of the mission have created unique demands

on the division staff—the Task Force Eagle (TFE) staff—that plans and coordinates division operations. On a daily basis, TFE units confront potentially hostile armies, local leaders and residents from three different ethnic groups, representatives from a multitude of international agencies, and the omnipresent media as they implement the provisions of the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP).

Given this situation, Brigadier General Stanley F. Cherrie, former Assistant Division Commander (Maneuver) for the 1st Armor Division, believes there are definite differences in the requirements for combat and for peace enforcement battle staffs. For combat or for combat training center rotations, he said the commander is surrounded by “killers”: his Deputy Fire Support Coordinator, Army Aviation Officer, and Air Liaison Officer, for example. Within a week of establishing TFE headquarters in Tuzla, Major General William L. Nash, Commander of the 1st Armor Division, the first division to lead TFE, altered the paradigm. He had his lawyer and political advisor (POLAD) next to him to provide advice and action and the civil affairs (CA) officer, public affairs officer (PAO), psychological operations (PSYOP) officer, and joint commission officer right behind him on the next tier; the division artillery (DIVARTY) commander, air liaison officer (ALO), and Army air officer were necessarily given a third row seat.⁴¹ Brigadier General Bob Wood, Assistant Division Commander (Maneuver) for 1st Armor Division during its second iteration as TFE headquarters, echoed the idea that non-lethal fires—and therefore their staff officer proponents—have a more prominent role in peace enforcement.⁴² In his Military Review article on Task Force Eagle, Brigadier General Cherrie said that the TFE headquarters consisted of the standard division headquarters plus “add-on specialties” to ensure success in the peace enforcement environment.⁴³ His

comments regarding killers and add-on specialties suggest there is merit in identifying the requirements for peace enforcement so that planners can forge a more competent peace enforcement planning staff. The first requirement is to identify the key functions on the planning staff that facilitate the division's response to the many demands.

An important function for the mission in Bosnia was information operations and the officer that represented that function for the staff. Information operations (IO) are not new, but the effort to synchronize the various components that have traditionally worked independently is an emerging concept that has been truly tested in Bosnia.⁴⁴ The complexity of the operational environment and the nature of the operation made Bosnia ripe for IO; it was an "information war."⁴⁵ Information operations contributed to the enforcement of the GFAP by planning non-lethal fires to change attitudes and to reduce resistance to implementing the civil aspects of the accord. Given the rules of engagement for the NATO mission, IO was often the best means available for executing implementation tasks.⁴⁶ Each division that served as TFE Headquarters recognized the importance in the peace enforcement environment of integrating IO—employing the expertise of CA, PSYOP, PA, G5, and PMO—at all levels and all events.

When the 1st Armor Division deployed to Bosnia, it did not have a designated information operations officer. The division's PAO, PSYOP, and CA officers represented their special skills within the planning staff, and the division's chief of staff ensured synchronization of their work.⁴⁷ As 1st Infantry Division prepared to replace 1st Armor Division as TFE Headquarters, Major General Montgomery Meigs, Commander of the 1st Infantry Division, asked the Land Information Warfare Activity (LIWA) for assistance in developing an information operations campaign for the TFE area of

operations.⁴⁸ The 1st Cavalry Division's Deputy Fire Support Coordinator (DFSCOORD) served as the Information Officer for that division's rotation as TFE Headquarters. From his perspective, information operations in Bosnia required "Ph.D.-level synchronization of the type message and delivery."⁴⁹ Because the IO contribution was both critical and complex, TFE planning staffs ultimately created an IO working group, discussed more in the next chapter, to integrate IO into the division's plans.⁵⁰

Within the purview of IO, civil affairs (CA) was the component of the division's information operations team that had a particularly important role in facilitating implementation of the civil aspects of the GFAP. The CA effort, like most operations in Bosnia, was decentralized, and brigade and battalion staffs received CA teams to conduct operations.⁵¹ US Army CA personnel with functional expertise in government, law enforcement, economics, public facilities, and public health assisted in rebuilding civilian institutions and infrastructure. Additionally, they coordinated much of the nongovernmental organization (NGO) activity in their sector, helping to restore basic public services, developing plans for repatriation of refugees, and obtaining money, material, and manpower for many projects. CA representatives also participated in Joint Military Commissions (JMC) at all echelons throughout Bosnia, working with mayors, police chiefs, civil authorities and the population in general.⁵² Their presence among the population and interaction with local leaders provided valuable input into the division planning assessment of the threat, of compliance, and of progress towards civilian reconciliation. The CA officer on the division staff was the focal point for receiving and compiling such information to develop the big picture of the division's area. He then coordinated the efforts of the teams dispersed throughout the division sector to ensure

their operations worked toward a common division objective. His situational awareness of the big picture was intended to ensure, for example, that what was happening in Vlasenica was consistent with what was happening in Zvornik. The division planning staff provided broad guidance to subordinate units for CA work.⁵³

PSYOP personnel also played a significant role in the execution of the IFOR and SFOR mission, giving the PSYOP officer an important role on the planning staff. As with the civil affairs work, teams attached to TFE brigades and battalions did most of the PSYOP work in Bosnia. The PSYOP officer on the division staff provided broad guidance and maintained situational awareness to maintain a consistent division effort.⁵⁴ While combat PSYOP tries to weaken enemy morale and induce surrender or desertion, the PSYOP effort in the Bosnia peace enforcement mission was to compel compliance and to influence the decision-making of the Bosnian factions and civil leaders.⁵⁵ The constant presence of PSYOP teams among the civilian population promoted IFOR and SFOR credibility and fairness and ensured the population was correctly informed about NATO efforts.⁵⁶ PSYOP themes included support for normalcy, repatriation, ethnic tolerance, and freedom of movement, which teams promulgated through radio spots and talk shows, TV, newspapers, magazines, and town hall meetings.⁵⁷ Additionally, PSYOPS personnel promoted a mine awareness campaign targeting children with posters and comic books.⁵⁸ Complementing the CA effort, the PSYOP presence also provided unique intelligence and other information about civilians and about hostile, neutral, and friendly forces that was important to the division's planning effort.⁵⁹

The public affairs officer (PAO) was another particularly important participant in TFE's IO effort. IFOR troops had a constant media presence from the time 3-325

Airborne Battalion deployed from Vicenza.⁶⁰ The world was curious to know if NATO could end what the UN and European Union could not. Furthermore, this deployment was novel and very visible: it was NATO's first "out of area" operation and it included several non-NATO partners. Consequently, the interaction with the media was critical to success and a key task for commanders.⁶¹

Public affairs officers have two major roles in Bosnia: to provide information about current operations to TFE soldiers and to serve as the command's liaison officer with the civilian media. The division PAO concentrated on the command information program for consumption by TFE soldiers. An in-country radio station, AFN-Bosnia, and a regular magazine, The Talon, helped keep soldiers apprised of the situation around them.⁶² More relevant for TFE planning was the Coalition Press Information Center (CPIC), which focused on the external audience in cooperation with CA, PSYOP, and other actors in the IO working group. The CPIC addressed the second major PA role in Bosnia. The PAO working within the CPIC conducted or facilitated press conferences, background briefings, and fact sheets to keep the media informed and to shield the commander from constant pressure for personal interviews.⁶³ Coupled with PSYOP and demonstrations of lethal combat power, TFE used PA to influence the perceptions and decision-making of the factions by demonstrating NATO credibility and resolve to enforce the GFAP.⁶⁴ Consistent with the highly visible nature of this multinational operation, the exchange with international and local media, furthermore, gave planners a source of intelligence and provided early warning of issues about which the next higher commanders might ask.⁶⁵

The synchronization of the different IO elements within the division has been a major pursuit of division planners. A shared understanding of the big picture and of the division's objectives is essential for exploiting the capabilities of each specialty. PA and PSYOP, for example, have worked together to counter ethnic propaganda and to advance SFOR themes.⁶⁶ Because information operations have in many cases become the main effort of TFE operations, there needs to be a single point of contact for coordinating the efforts of several staff elements. Lieutenant Colonel Stephen W. Shanahan and Lieutenant Colonel Garry J. Beavers, officers who served with LIWA and have considerable expertise within the IO realm, recommend the division chief of staff wear this mantle since IO planning crosses staff boundaries. They also speculate about whether a change to doctrine is warranted.⁶⁷ That issue may need to wait until IO officers have been trained and assigned throughout the force in accordance with the personnel system for Force XXI that recognizes IO as a separate career field. In the meantime, information operations is a "battlefield operating system (BOS) with no boss," yet it is a vital function, so the division leadership must assign responsibility and execute.⁶⁸

The political advisor or POLAD is another essential player in peace enforcement operations whose value has been consistently proven in TFE operations. Two overriding characteristics of the peace enforcement environment are that it is inherently political and that it is multinational.⁶⁹ The POLAD's direct relationship with the commander and his ability to liaise with outside organizations gave him a unique ability to help the commander shape TFE's political-military environment. For the same reasons, he also provided for the division planners insights on how operations could affect local leaders

and on the issues and attitudes of the general populace. By being in touch with the political situation at several echelons, the POLAD made recommendations within the planning staff to enable them to develop creative ways to apply military capabilities to compel compliance with the GFAP.⁷⁰

A core task for the POLAD was to establish liaison, to be where the commander and staff could not necessarily be. He was the senior civilian on commander's staff, so he established contact with senior personnel of many non-military agencies and organizations, American and international. Examples included Congressional members, allied defense representatives, NATO ambassadors, Bosnian leaders, UN special representatives, and Department of Defense and Department of State personnel. Although the POLAD was primarily a personal advisor to the commander, he was a key reference for the staff. He would obtain and share such information on such issues as background, intent, and likely outcomes. This source of political intelligence helped the G2 planners make assessments and guided the planning staff's preparation of future probable developments. It gave early indications that enabled planning. For example, the POLAD's predictions about the results of the Brcko administration and expected reactions gave SFOR time to plan for security in response.⁷¹

The POLAD's contribution to the division planning staff's situational awareness was a major factor in the staff's ability to assess TFE's progress towards accomplishing its end state. He recognized and communicated the interaction of political events and competing agendas at all levels.⁷² He could understand the political maneuvering of each ethnic group, plus their interaction with SFOR and with other agencies of the international community. His efforts to identify trends and his insights from his

extensive contacts also enabled him to predict the repercussions of TFE actions. The POLAD, therefore, contributed to contingency planning by identifying the expected environment, recommending strategies to shape the environment, and helping the planners stay focused and proactive.⁷³ Finally, there is no formal means of transmitting policy to commanders and of obtaining their input into the policy debate above the division. The POLAD provided such a means in Bosnia. He helped ensure unity of effort and served as an advocate for the strategies and policies of the TFE commander, increasing the likelihood that the policy debates consider would more accurately consider the military capabilities of the force.⁷⁴

The lesson, then, is that the role of non-lethal fires players is much more prominent in the peace enforcement planning staff than in the combat battle staff. The special skills officers—CA, PSYOP, and PA—exist within the combat battle staff, but their roles are secondary to the combat arms officers. This is not the case in peace enforcement operations, where these special skills and possibly others, are dominant. Brigadier General Cherrie said TFE did not have to reinvent the staff, but that it had to be creative in its distribution of labor. He also emphasized the fact that going into such a high visibility and politically important operation, a division would receive all of the resources, including special staff members, it needed for success.⁷⁵ The provision of a POLAD to assist TFE commanders and staffs—as well as the augmentation of brigade and battalion staffs—is a case in point.

Chapter IV

PLANNING STAFF STRUCTURES FOR A PEACE ENFORCEMENT OPERATION

In his study of the occupation of Germany, Major Kenneth O. McCreedy discussed the proliferation of planning organizations that emerged during post-war planning. Most of the burden for post-war planning—analogue to the peace enforcement operation in Bosnia—fell on the G3 (Operations) and G5 (Civil-Military) staff sections. The creation of a Posthostilities Planning Subsection (PPS) within G3 and a German Country Unit (GCU) within G5, however, suggests that even then, there was a recognition that the combat battle staff alone is not sufficient for peace enforcement operations.⁷⁶ IFOR's mission focused on compliance with the GFAP, and SFOR ensures continued compliance. At the same time, SFOR units have become more involved than IFOR units in supporting the civil aspects of the GFAP, yet SFOR troop strength is about half of what IFOR's was. It is imperative, then, that TFE staffs prioritize the supporting tasks and provide guidance and direction for their accomplishment.⁷⁷ With the key functions within the peace enforcement planning staff identified, the next requirement is to identify the structures TFE planning staffs created to facilitate their task prioritization and guidance.⁷⁸

A significant characteristic of the operation in Bosnia—and of many peace enforcement operations—is that it is a “corporal's war.” Most of the operations to actually implement the GFAP are company or platoon operations. Success depends on the junior leaders knowing and understanding their standing operating procedures, the rules of engagement, the graduated response matrix, and the GFAP reporting requirements.⁷⁹ The planning staff, then, looked out to the next compliance deadline in the case of IFOR or to the contentious issues that might require a coordinated plan for response. With subordinate commanders entrusted to conduct compliance and support

activities in their sectors, the division staff provided overall direction in planning and command and control in execution. This decentralization was not without risk. Tactical incidents and the decisions of junior leaders could have strategic consequences. The Zvornik Seven incident, for example, was the result of an artillery raid at platoon level.⁸⁰ Division level resources and oversight, then, remain important, but various TFE structures distinguish peace enforcement planning from combat battle staff planning.

One structure to emerge from the transition from IFOR to SFOR was the integrated division and brigade staffs. Under IFOR, the American component of TFE consisted of the 1st Armor Division headquarters and two American brigades. As indicated earlier, SFOR assumed control of Operation JOINT GUARD with about half as many troops as IFOR. In the American sectors, battalions replaced brigades. The brigade staffs deployed to Bosnia, but they were incorporated into the division staff, with mixed results.⁸¹ In some cases, the brigade staff officers served in current operations jobs more than plans jobs. During the 2nd Armor Cavalry Regiment's (ACR) rotation, the 1st Armor Division was again the TFE headquarters. Major Richard Piscal was the Regimental S3; in Bosnia, he was dual-hatted as the Regimental S3 and the Deputy G3 for the division. As such, he saw the challenges associated with a lack of unity of command. During planning and execution of many operations, the squadron staffs would have to answer redundant questions from regimental staff officers and division staff officers; from the perspective of a squadron staff officer, higher headquarters planning must not have looked efficient or well-coordinated. Another issue with the integrated staff was the production of orders. Many division operations orders went directly to

squadrons for execution instead of through the regiment, and they lacked the detail typical of a regimental order and important for squadron execution.⁸²

Among the most influential structures TFE staffs created was the Joint Military Commission or JMC. The primary aspect of the operation in Bosnia involved NATO military commanders interacting with the formerly belligerent Bosnian commanders to enforce the military provisions of the peace accord. The JMC was the structure that facilitated this interaction, and it had both a planning and an operations aspect.⁸³ In planning and in execution, the JMC helped compel compliance with the military provisions of the GFAP. The JMC assisted in the assessment of TFE's progress towards accomplishing the military tasks that served the political objectives. Eventually, JMCs also contributed to the assessment of progress towards compliance with the civil aspects of the GFAP.

When TFE deployed into Bosnia, it encountered a British Joint Commission Officer (JCO) who provided liaison and particularly important, communications with the factions. Major General Nash selected an American officer, Colonel Hank Stratman, to be his JCO inside TF Eagle headquarters. Colonel Stratman formed a JMC cell that included a lieutenant colonel, a Yugoslavia expert from the Air Force, and several noncommissioned officers.⁸⁴ Over time, the JMC matured to a full staff section that became a focal point for planning TFE operations in Bosnia. With Annex 1 of the GFAP as its mandate, the JMC provided forum to resolve problems, to disseminate policy, to provide instructions for implementing policies or procedures, and to coordinate specific actions the GFAP required.⁸⁵ As a focal point for division operations, the JMC obtained a great deal of information critical to the division's planning process. Colonel Stratman

compiled a set of indicators from across the staff sections to measure faction compliance with the peace accord. He used these indicators during the JMC process to compile information the JCOs out in the towns within TFE's sector collected and came back to the division headquarters with a progress report.⁸⁶ His input—and the input of follow-on division JMCs—contributed to division planning for IO and for contingency plans. The JMC input helped preserve the division's fighting force for decisive engagements by indicating ways to use non-lethal tools to shape local actions.⁸⁷

By the time the 1st Cavalry Division led TFE, it was clear that the JMC made a valuable contribution to the ability of TFE to determine its impact on the military and civil aspects of the peace process. Colonel Ramke, an officer with experience on the Joint Staff and with contacts in the US State Department, led 1st Cavalry Division's JMC. He formed a Joint Assessment Team (JAT) as a tool within the JMC. The JAT's role was to investigate allegations of non-compliance and to get the parties' military commanders together. Although this was mainly an operational structure for TFE, the information its members acquired during their operations was, again, critical to enforcing compliance and assessing progress, which was important to directing the division's planning process.⁸⁸

As the previous chapter discussed, TFE commanders in Bosnia recognized the value of information operations and designated an IO officer. Just as the divisions needed to designate an IO officer from within their staffs, so too did most find it necessary to establish an IO Council, Cell, or Working Group; they acknowledged the need to focus and synchronize different specialties within the field. The difference in the environment from IFOR to SFOR, furthermore, made IO even more a player than during

Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR. The former factions had developed unconventional strategies to accomplish their goals, circumventing NATO efforts to facilitate normalization. IO was essential to trying to shape such an environment more conducive to NATO implementation. Major General Grange, Commander of 1st Infantry Division, discussed this aspect of the environment in his article on unconventional military approaches to peacekeeping operations. In particular, he discussed the need to sever the links between organized crime, the black market, and disinformation and the leaders who benefit from their activities. He believed an integrated campaign that included information operations, conventional and unconventional military capabilities, and intelligence was key to setting the conditions that would allow the creation of a politically stable environment.⁸⁹

A division's Public Affairs Officer (PAO) chaired an early TFE IO Council, which consisted of representatives from the G3, G2, JMC, CA, PSYOP, and Joint Information Bureau. This council met regularly to identify issues that could impact operations, and to develop a plan for information dissemination.⁹⁰ Later, a designated IO officer, supported by representatives from the Land Information Warfare Activity (LIWA) took the lead. Once it was established, the IO Cell was key to all non-time sensitive division planning.⁹¹ In 1st Cavalry Division, the Deputy Fire Support Coordinator served as the division's IO Officer, with a team of two majors, four captains, and LIWA representatives who met with the officers who held combat battle staff roles as well as those officers who held jobs previously determined to be considered more critical in the peace enforcement environment, including representatives from PSYOP and CA, and the POLAD and PAO.

IO was new for NATO operations, and the structures that existed above TFE had a significant impact on the ability of TFE's IO components to accomplish their missions. NATO and SHAPE had just revised its doctrine of public information--public affairs--and PSYOP. Although both organizations understood that IO had to be synchronized with the commander's intent and objectives, only ad hoc committees existed at IFOR and at the ARRC, and they were not under NATO command and control during IFOR. Also complicating the IO process was the multinational aspect of IFOR and SFOR; each nation had different ideas about how to conduct IO, and specific aspects of IO—namely CA and PSYOP—were rarely ever fully nested from the SFOR level down to the battalion level.⁹² There were also some initial challenges to integrate IO into the planning staff and planning process.

The intelligence system established to support TFE operations in Bosnia had to address standard and nonstandard intelligence requirements and had to operate in a multinational environment. Tailoring forces to optimize support is nothing new to intelligence operations, but the demands of Bosnia called for several innovations at different echelons in equipment use and structures for management and for analysis.⁹³ At the TFE level, the G2 (Intelligence) section established a long-term analysis and a short-term analysis shop that helped focus analytical work and support to planners, a division of labor not too unusual to see among a division's intelligence analysts.⁹⁴ A structure that TFE established that was unusual and that highlighted the nature of the mission in Bosnia was the G2X. The G2X was the mission management section within the G2 for counterintelligence (CI) and human intelligence (HUMINT) operations. This is unusual in that CI and HUMINT typically fall under the purview of the division collection

manager, as do the other intelligence disciplines. Operations in Bosnia demanded more CI and HUMINT resources than is typical for a division, especially for force protection. Derived from concepts for intelligence at the joint level and comprised of a national agency liaison officer and soldiers from all services, the G2X became indispensable in TFE intelligence and planning operations.⁹⁵ In combat, CI and HUMINT, while important sources of intelligence, tend not to be the primary collectors at the division level. TFE received robust intelligence support from echelons above division agencies, with particular emphasis on CI and HUMINT. Force protection teams deployed throughout the TFE sector, and tactical commanders relied on their information.⁹⁶ CI and HUMINT contributed to TFE's enforcement of compliance with the peace accord and largely facilitated division interaction with local civilians, whose perceptions and attitudes were a measure of Dayton's progress and NATO's success. CI and HUMINT were the primary collectors in the theater and major collectors at the division level; the 1st Cavalry Division found ninety percent of the information CI and HUMINT teams provided actionable.⁹⁷

As TFE became more involved with the implementation of the GFAP's civil aspects, another innovation occurred with the interaction of CI with CA and PSYOP and the resulting impact on the planning staff. CI and HUMINT was an important component of information operations in Bosnia. Teams benefited from the expertise of CA, PSYOP, and the POLAD, and from the UN and other international organizations that were constantly out among the local population. These agencies were producers and consumers of intelligence. The G2X worked to coordinate and deconflict all CI and HUMINT activity within TFE's sector, but it also worked to synchronize those

operations with the entire IO effort.⁹⁸ This gave CI and HUMINT more than the usual impact in the division planning effort.

During combat operations, division commanders rarely seek to formulate policy or strategy; their operations tend to be a means to accomplish established political ends. Peace enforcement operations, though, are predominantly political-military operations in which a key task for a theater commander is shaping the political-military environment through the use of military capabilities.⁹⁹ Actions junior leaders take can have strategic or at least operational implications. Under these circumstances, it is critical that division leaders have a full appreciation of NCA directives and political sensitivities associated with the operation. This requires not only traditional war fighting skills, but also the ability to apply non-traditional military capabilities, innovation, and people skills.¹⁰⁰ This environment also suggests a need to look beyond the division's next tactical operation.

Strategic planning was not an issue for IFOR. Although it was commonly accepted that a US presence in Bosnia would extend beyond the initial one-year mandate, 1st Armor Division was not going to be among the forces that stayed. The division derived operational objectives from its environment and turned them into tactical tasks that were nested with higher headquarters' intent.¹⁰¹ Under SFOR, however, TFE established a strategic plans team or cell to look at longer range planning. The strategic plans team initially consisted of the same officers who conducted routine TFE planning, but it eventually was led by a separate officer identified specifically to conduct strategic planning. While he drew on the expertise from within the planning staff, his focus was on long term planning for the division. His work involved making

assessments of the division's progress towards accomplishing the objectives of the peace accord and guiding the division towards continued progress.¹⁰²

The strategic plans team received little assistance from higher headquarters. The mission in Bosnia lacked a unified political direction for overall peace implementation, and the GFAP itself provided three structures for implementation: IFOR for the military, the High Representative for coordinating civil aspects, and the Donors Conference for stimulating reconstruction. The lack of an overall structure for developing unified policy hindered synchronization of civil-military implementation.¹⁰³ Also significant was NATO's shift of policy by April 1996. The slow timelines associated with the implementation of the civil aspects of the GFAP prompted General Joulwan, Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) to direct more IFOR assistance to civil agencies.¹⁰⁴ The strategic plans team helped TFE take the longer-range perspective required to comply. The division of strategic, operational, tactical operations become blurred in peace enforcement operations, but planning staffs at all levels are likely to continue to work in such an environment, and a strategic plans team with the ability to focus division planners and subject matter experts on the bigger picture could be invaluable.

When SFOR replaced IFOR, the composition of TFE dwindled considerably. Instead of two US brigades along side the multinational brigades, one US brigade divided responsibility for the US sector, and executing units were battalions or squadrons. The brigade staffs, however, were not robust enough to command and control Task Force Eagle; a division staff was still necessary to take the lead. TFE planning staffs adapted to

the environment they were in and created different structures to capitalize on expertise and facilitate division operations.

Chapter V

PLANNING STAFF PROCEDURES FOR A PEACE ENFORCEMENT OPERATION

As the combat battle staffs of each division that became TFE headquarters deployed to Bosnia, they adjusted key players and created planning structures to be more relevant for the peace enforcement environment. A final staff requirement to consider in this environment is the procedures the planning staffs used. Combat battle staffs rely on the military decision-making process described in FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations, for most of their work. They also conduct targeting meetings, establish and maintain a battle rhythm, and conduct huddles and updates as necessary to facilitate their work. The peace enforcement planning staffs used similar procedures, but they tailored the traditional processes to accommodate the demands of their operational environment.¹⁰⁵

Brigadier General Stanley F. Cherrie, former Assistant Division Commander for 1st Armor Division, identified several factors that made the peace enforcement environment different from a combat environment, with a resulting impact on division planning. There is significantly more information to process, especially if the unit—as was the 1st Armor Division in Bosnia—is the first to deploy into an immature theater. The division had to form, train, and deploy forces, build base camps, train UN forces transitioning to the IFOR contingent, conduct its enforcement mission, and provide for force protection simultaneously. TFE's initial mission was tied to a timetable of

compliance, with specific actions required to be complete within thirty days, sixty days, ninety days, and one hundred and twenty days. All of these involved initial planner efforts and generated demands for information.¹⁰⁶ The prohibition against deploying enabling forces early greatly complicated the division's challenges in tracking and managing information. LTC Michael D. Jones, the commander of 2-67 Armor who became the commander of the 1st Armor Division's Deployment Operations Center (DOC), noted that the division staff had many challenges planning adequately because of simultaneous training and deployment requirements. He concluded that a unit cannot deploy itself; trying to form, train, plan for, and execute a deployment and a mission was practically impossible.¹⁰⁷

Commenting on planning in general for a peace enforcement operation, Brigadier General Wood noted that Bosnia was not the National Training Center. There were no breaks in the mission cycle, the division had to plan deep and think past the objective, strategy counted, non-lethal fires were equally or more important than lethal fires, and future operations were real. He also noted that Bosnia was a unique battlefield in terms of hostility as an art form, asymmetric escalation, and progress on the side.¹⁰⁸

Eventually, the TFE planning staff became less decisively engaged in routine compliance operations. Major General Nash had relatively few decisions to make at his level. Reflecting the idea of the "corporal's war" and decentralization previously discussed, he entrusted mission accomplishment to his brigade commanders, while he worked the political interface and juggled the requirements to address both the US and the NATO chains of command. Division planners, meanwhile, began looking at the next mark on the time line and the next major move for the division. During 1st Armor

Division's first deployment, division planners did not have a strategic vision; they focused almost exclusively on the GFAP timeline and the division's redeployment. Once the zone of separation was marked, weapons storage sites (WSS) established, and freedom of movement operations underway, division planners turned to the areas of transfer that had to occur, to categorizing and tracking WSS, and to security for the Bosnian elections. The Brcko Arbitration was not yet a high priority, and an exit strategy and strategic planning were left to TFE's higher headquarters.¹⁰⁹ As SFOR's presence became more permanent, division planning occurred in an environment of general compliance, but with a substructure of paramilitary and criminal activity. Displaced persons and refugees (DPRE) and election support dominated several TFE planning efforts. 1st Cavalry Division, like several divisions before it, still had to contend with the Brcko decision and anticipated demonstrations as a backdrop for planning. Additionally, the division developed plans for how to work with the Entities' Armed Forces (EAF) to demilitarize Brcko. Strategic planning became more significant with the more permanent SFOR presence. While maintaining stability, TFE considered opportunities to support moderate politicians to shift the balance of power away from hardliners; to influence professionalization of the EAF; and to foster trust and confidence in the Republika Srpska.¹¹⁰

Success in this environment did not require an entirely new process. Brigadier General Cherrie and two former Deputy G3 officers said the military decision making process worked well enough for collecting the multitude of data demanded and for presenting information to the commander.¹¹¹ Once TFE was established, there were not a lot of moving pieces at the division level, but the division worked a lot of reception,

staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) issues and longer range planning.

The MDMP was part of the TFE battle rhythm. Major General Nash used the same techniques in Bosnia as he had during Desert Storm: battle—planning—staff briefings were separate off-cycle sessions during the mid-morning or later at night.¹¹²

TFE did make two noteworthy modifications to the MDMP, however, to adapt it to the peace enforcement environment. The first was the development of the Multinational Division North (MND(N)) Thought Process. Adapted from some of the lessons it learned during its transition with 1st Armor Division, the 1st Cavalry Division formalized the MND(N) Thought Process. The process modified the MDMP for routine operations to ensure political and civilian dimensions were included. Steps in the process included verifying first reports, building situational awareness, developing the operational context, examining the coalition aspects, developing courses of action and considering second and third order effects, obtaining refined guidance, selecting the course of action, and issuing the order. The process emphasized continuous staff estimates and required an evaluation following execution of an operation. This process showed an appreciation for the different information requirements of the peace enforcement environment and sought to ensure soldiers had comprehensive situational awareness of their operational context.¹¹³

The second modification was the inclusion of a strategic plans meeting in the process. This was, in part, a reaction to TFE's expanded role in the implementation of the civil aspects of the GFAP. Competing national interests and different planning processes at each national level made a clearly defined end state elusive. The lack of integrated multinational strategic planning encouraged ad hoc efforts. Peace enforcement

operations are likely to continue to come to the military without complete strategic clarity, so that military leaders and staffs will need to use a combination of deliberate and crisis action planning methods to define ends, ways, and means.¹¹⁴ The 1st Infantry Division coined the term “slinky effect” to describe how its planning process impacted on the strategic level. In this process, an idea for an enforcement requirement emerged from the division planning process and was pushed up to the strategic level. It then came back down to the division level with or without guidance and modification. In describing his division’s process, Lieutenant Colonel Joe Robinson, former G3, discussed the need for TFE to be creative in planning because there was no set end state; amelioration was the overall objective. Weekly predictive assessments that helped identify links between elements in Bosnia that TFE could influence began the process during an executive board. A subsequent board that the Chief of Staff chaired developed guidance for areas of concern that emerged from the executive board. Lieutenant Colonel Robinson said that TFE’s analysis gave the commander a perspective that was invaluable in influencing strategy, and that TFE initiated the strategic and operational thought for the theater.¹¹⁵

In the 1st Cavalry Division, the Assistant Division Commander, Brigadier General James M. Dubik chaired these meetings. They were pulse checks of short-term progress, as well as assessment of progress towards mid to long-range benchmarks for accomplishing what they believed to be NATO’s end state. The planners recognized that their end state was not necessarily concrete. From 1st Cavalry Division’s perspective, the division could influence but not necessarily create the conditions to satisfy the strategic objectives that would allow US troops to disengage from Bosnia. The impact of their planning was a recommendation for force structure changes based on operating

conditions, with input bubbling up from lower to influence higher.¹¹⁶ The reality of the peace enforcement environment is that staff planners may find their efforts require a level of political knowledge and sophistication formerly associated with soldier-statesmen at the highest levels.

In addition to the MDMP, a key battle staff procedure in combat is the targeting meeting. This meeting focuses the use of division resources and synchronizes the effects of several battlefield operating systems. Fires doctrine and fire support tasks do not change during peace enforcement operations, but some characteristics of the environment that impact fires planning do change. Civilians are interspersed with belligerents, the rules of engagement impose restrictions, and the multinational and joint operations require close coordination for planning and clearance of fires.¹¹⁷ In Bosnia, the capability to bring lethal fires to bear on a situation was an important aspect of compelling compliance, but more often than not, non-lethal fires were the preferred course of action. This meant that targeting meetings as typically conducted during combat operations were not conducted in Bosnia during most divisions' tenure as TFE headquarters. Instead, units conducted Information Operations (IO) Synchronization Meetings or targeting meetings that drove the IO process.

The planning staff or the division commander identified the planners' focus for the IO Synchronization Meetings. During 1st Armor Division's first rotation in Bosnia, the staff identified target pressure points and objectives and produced an initial synchronization matrix.¹¹⁸ Later division commanders identified the problem sets for planners, who built on intelligence assessments to further define them. Examples of target sets included resettlement of the Sapna Thumb and Doboje areas, municipal

elections, law and order, and economic development, police units, radio towers, and the Brcko decision. Having identified the problem or target sets, the planners used a synchronization matrix to capture the themes they thought appropriate and how they envisioned each battlefield operating system influencing the target. The staff planned for non-lethal means and lethal threats, and the matrix deconflicted and synchronized such activity. Key participants included the Chief of Staff, G2, G3, PSYOP, CA, PAO, Coalition Press Information Center, POLAD, JMC, and the LIWA Field Support Team. The planners developed tools to refine IO planning and tracking. Several were similar to those used for combat targeting, but they were adapted to the peace enforcement environment. A pressure point worksheet identified potential ways to influence target audiences; an IO planning worksheet determined how and when to influence those audiences; and implementation matrix provided detailed information to track IO efforts and provide updates to the commander as much as two weeks out from an event; and an implementation graphic portrayed scheduled IO activity during specific time periods. This process was a creative application of the combat targeting process.¹¹⁹

While early TFE headquarters did not call the meetings that directed their IO efforts targeting meetings, 1st Cavalry Division did. The division also conducted its meetings using combat targeting techniques. The DFSCoord led the meetings and used D3A methodology to identify who was to receive the division message and what that message was. The planners involved in targeting met once a week to look at the next week and to set the messages for the next three weeks. The assessment aspect of D3A was the most difficult and required considerable time. The planners used an event matrix to coordinate events and to integrate IO into all division activities.¹²⁰

Division planners during the IFOR rotation used what they knew as operational art and design and were fairly successful in adapting to incorporate IO into division plans. Though recognizing that IO in a peace enforcement operation in Bosnia was fundamentally different from IO support to combat in Korea, one planner did not think the division needed to establish a separate IO framework for planning. The combat targeting process that identifies targets, intelligence requirements, and resources and assigns responsibility is one that can work for peace enforcement and the application of non-lethal fires. One comprehensive targeting meeting that solicited input from all players in the IO arena would be more effective than multiple meetings. In peace enforcement operations, IO, supported by the threat of military force, tends to be the main effort in compelling an adversary and accomplishing an objective. Planners should consider IO as a means of achieving ends, and therefore use IO in the planning process as they would any other combat function. The G3 planner should take the lead on soliciting IO options and on educating the commanders on IO capabilities and limitations.¹²¹

The Joint Military Commission (JMC) was another division staff procedure that impacted planning. The JMC was both a planning structure and an operations structure and process, assisting commanders in using non-lethal means to shape local actions and to preserve combat power for decisive engagements.¹²² It was a key liaison mechanism for compelling compliance, and it specifically dealt with the military aspects of implementing the GFAP. The JMC worked with division planners, particularly within the G2, to track the SFOR-mandated draw down of the entities' armed forces (EAF) weapons and contribute to the intelligence assessments that drove division operations. The JMC thus had an impact on the division's strategic thought and direction. Because

the structure and the process were not doctrinal, though, the JMC's contribution to the division was personality dependent, and TFE planners witnessed effective and ineffective JMC operations.¹²³

The planning staff for a peace enforcement operation has the same responsibility as the combat battle staff: to provide information to help the commander make and execute decisions. The military decision making process is still relevant and still the best way to define a problem, and the planners still have a battle rhythm that includes briefings, huddles, and updates. Targeting meetings take on a different character in peace enforcement, but they provide the best way to synchronize all of the division's lethal and non-lethal fires. The lack of a single, focused targeting meeting and the proliferation of other meetings could work against coherence and synchronization. Peace enforcement requires creative application of staff talents and traditional procedures.

CONCLUSION

The fundamental requirements for the planning staff in a sustained peace support operation are the same as those for the battle staff in a combat operation, but there are some significant refinements. The planning process still requires a chief planner to lead it and to integrate the efforts of all of the battlefield operating systems. Feedback is still critical to drive and adapt the process. The military decision making process remains the best way to rationalize the work of the planners and to promote thoroughness in their products. The differences in the requirements for a peace enforcement planning staff derive from the environment and from the mission parameters. Instead of combat operations such as attack and defend, enforcement of a peace accord with military and

civil aspects involves perceptions and persuasion. The long duration of the mission—comparable to the post-hostilities phase of combat operations, except that US soldiers are not the belligerents—requires the division commander to look more strategically than the commander of a combat operation.

The division planning staff in this environment relies more on the subject matter expertise of “soft skill” officers—CA, PSYOP, IO, POLAD—than in a combat environment for input to generate the planning process and for course of action options. The structures that can facilitate planning operations probably challenged TFE staffs the most, as each grappled with the information demands. Although some of the structures that emerged from TFE were specifically focused on the Balkan region and the GFAP demands, structures like the JMC, the G2X, and the IO Council are readily adaptable to other peace enforcement operations. The Strategic Plans Team or Cell could be valuable in defining success and progress for the operation. Finally, while the basics of division staff operations depend on the procedures that are familiar to those with a combat orientation, there are differences in the lead players and the dynamics.

Other judgments emerged from reviewing TFE planning staff operations that may serve future planners. Division battle staffs must be resourced and tailored to accomplish the peace enforcement mission. To date, no division deployed to Bosnia with just its organic division staff; several key augmentees were battle staff participants. Organic staffs are not robust enough to accomplish all of the tasks required and maintain twenty-four hour operations. Reservists have a major role to play in peace enforcement operations, including participation in the battle staff. They served as some of the augmentees to facilitate continuous operations, but they also provided some of the

expertise critical to the environment, such as the CA and PSYOP officers. The chief division planner should consider training, integration, and rotation issues as he evaluates the competency and integrity of his battle staff. Reservists may join the division after it has conducted its mission rehearsal training, requiring some further training and integration work. Continuity is an issue the planners ought to address in battle staff SOPs. Finally, the G3 plans chief is still the focal point for any division planning process. If a new idea or an unfamiliar staff expert is going to be heard and accepted by the entire planning staff, the G3 plans chief must be the first to embrace it.

TFE staffs did not necessarily operate with peak efficiency, but they applied creative solutions to the challenges of the mission in Bosnia and reduced the ad hocery within their own planning staffs. Most of their solutions were not discussed in depth in doctrine, so capturing their procedures to learn from their experience is worthwhile. The post-Cold War Army thinks differently about many of its organizations and operations. Planners of the future need to adhere to the timeless fundamentals but appreciate what makes peace enforcement different and adapt their structures and methods accordingly.

ENDNOTES

¹These operations are not new to the US Army, but participation in very visible operations has increased since the fall of the Berlin Wall. The debate over terms seems to have also increased. Stability and support operations (SASO) is the most current Army term for military operations other than war or MOOTW. It refers to the employment of military capabilities for operations short of war, but these capabilities can be used before, during, or after a war. MOOTW remains the joint term, and several Army doctrinal manuals published before 1997, including FM 100-5, Operations, use MOOTW or OOTW instead of SASO. Department of the Army, FM 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Graphics (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1997), 1-143; 1-100. Department of the Army, FM 100-5, Operations (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1993), 13-1 – 13-8. Military Review has published several articles that debate the definition, the nature, and the doctrine of OOTW. Robert J. Bunker, "Rethinking OOTW," Military Review 75, no. 6 (November-December 1995): 34-41. John B. Hunt, "OOTW: A Concept in Flux," Military Review 76, no. 5 (September-October 1996): 3-9. Dane L. Rota, "Combat Decision Making in Operations Other than War," Military Review 76, no. 2 (March-April 1996): 24-28.

²Task Force Eagle initially deployed as part of the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR). It continues to operate as part of the Stabilization Force (SFOR). Both forces operate under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, which provides for peace enforcement operations. "History of the NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina," 16 November 1998 [document on-line]; available from <http://www.nato.int/sfor/docu/d981116a.htm>; Internet; accessed 12 September 1999.

³Although this is currently conventional wisdom among Army officers, it is also a fact for which the XVIII Airborne Corps is planning. In a discussion with COL Richard P. Zahner, G2, XVIII Airborne Corps, on 11 September 1999, the author confirmed that the Corps was planning for the rotations of three division headquarters to follow 10th Mountain Division (L) in Bosnia and for the provision of forces for the operation in Kosovo.

⁴Department of the Army, FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1997), 1-3. During two recent exercises, the current Advanced Military Studies Program (AMSP) class discussed at length the issue of developing and presenting a common shared understanding of a tactical problem. This is critical to the interaction between a commander and his staff and within the staff itself.

⁵*Ibid.*, p. vii.

⁶*Ibid.*, 2-3. The author consulted multiple field manuals and the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) to no avail to find a doctrinal reference for the term "battle staff." CALL references identified a battle staff at brigade and battalion, but not at the

division level. The 1st Infantry Division's Standing Operating Procedures (SOP) and the 3rd Infantry Division's Command Estimate Handbook do refer to their battle staffs; other divisions identify planning cells or groups instead. Briefing slides and class notes from the current AMSP course also provide insights on the battle staff. 1st Infantry Division, Standing Operating Procedures (SOP) (APO AE 09036: 1st Infantry Division, 20 April 1998), 2-2. 3rd Infantry Division, Command Estimate Handbook, on Planner's Toolbox [CD-Rom] (Fort Leavenworth, KS: AMSP, Summer 1999), P-1. 1st Armor Division, Field Standing Operating Procedures (FSOP) (APO AE 09252: 1st Armor Division), A-7-2. 1st Cavalry Division, Tactical Standing Operating Procedures (TACSOP) (Fort Hood, TX: 1st Cavalry Division, 13 March 1995), I-C-4-1.

⁷Department of the Army, FM 71-100, Division Operations (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1996), 3-1. Department of the Army, FM 71-100-1, Armored and Mechanized Division Operations Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, Final Draft (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1993), 2-7; 2-23 – 2-24. FM 71-100-2, Infantry Division Operations Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, is not substantively different from FM 71-100-1 in terms of guidance for planners. Since the division headquarters in Bosnia were heavy units until the recent turnover to 10th Mountain Division, the monograph uses FM 71-100-2 for most TTP references. Department of the Army, FM 71-100-2, Infantry Division Operations Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1993), 2-8 – 2-9; 2-31 – 2-60. In the last available Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) for a division staff, command group and staff tasks are listed as plan the battle, fight the battle, and sustain the division. Subtasks of plan the battle include developing a plan based on the mission; organizing and equipping the division for combat; planning fire support, electronic warfare, obstacles, communications, and air defense priorities; and integrating army aviation and air force assets; conducting intelligence preparation of the battlefield; and preparing the reconnaissance and surveillance plan. These tasks are still those that a battle staff must conduct during the planning process. Department of the Army, ARTEP 100-2, Army Training and Evaluation Program, Division Command Group and Staff (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1978), 3-1 – 3-16.

⁸Of four division SOPs the author was able to review, 1st Infantry Division and 3rd Infantry Division use the term battle staff. 1st Infantry Division, SOP, 2-2. 3rd Infantry Division, Command Estimate Handbook, P-1. 1st Armor Division and 1st Cavalry Division SOPs refer to division planning groups. 1st Armor Division, Field SOP, A-7-2. 1st Cavalry Division, TACSOP, I-C-4-1. By doctrine, the division has only one plans section. Department of the Army, FM 71-100, Division Operations (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1996), 3-7.

⁹FM 71-100, Division Operations, briefly explains the organization of the division plans section as a component of the division main command post. FM 71-100, Operations, 3-7. FM 71-100-1, Armored and Mechanized TTP, Final Draft, elaborates on the operations of the battle staff without actually using the term. FM 71-100-1, Armored and Mechanized TTP, Final Draft, 2-23 – 2-48; 2-104 – 2-188. The 1st Armor Division's Field SOP specifically identifies the assistant division staff officers as

members of the division's planning group. 1st Armor Division, Field SOP, A-7-2. The 3rd Infantry Division's Command Estimate Handbook lists its battle staff and provides duty descriptions for each. It also stipulates that the battle staff may expand depending on the mission and situation. 3rd Infantry Division, Command Estimate Handbook, P-1. In a discussion with AMSP students during the summer of 1999, a retired general officer with experience in Bosnia talked about commanders being surrounded by "killers" during their combat training center rotations, citing the G3, FSO, and ALO as examples. He set this up as a contrast to his experience in Bosnia, where the "killers" has a lesser role. The author's experience in tactical units and in recent AMSP exercises further highlights the key participants in planning for combat operations. The division battle staff, then, generally comprises the following officers or representatives from the listed section:

G1 Plans	Electronic Warfare Officer
G1 AG	G4 Plans
Safety	Division Transportation Officer
G2 Plans	Division Support Command
All Source Analysts and Technician	G5
Terrain Technician	Assistant Division Signal Officer
Staff Weather Officer	Air Liaison Officer
G3 Plans	Deputy Fire Support Coordinator
G3 Ops	Assistant Division Engineer
G3 Training	Division Chemical Officer
G3 Air	Provost Marshal
Air Defense	Resource Manager
Aviation Safety	Staff Judge Advocate
Deception	Public Affairs Officer
Psychological Operations	Chaplain
Division Surgeon	

¹⁰FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations, Annex L. FM 71-100-1, Armored and Mechanized Division TTP, Final Draft, 2-65 – 2-73.

¹¹FM 71-100 serves as the doctrinal basis for battle staff organization. FM 71-100, Division Operations, 3-5 – 3-10. FM 71-100-1 offers more detailed explanations of how these organizations might interact, and recent AMSP exercises provided important insights for battle staff operations. FM 71-100-1, Armored and Mechanized Division Operations TTP, Final Draft, 2-104 – 2-110.

¹²FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations, Chapter 5 provides substantial guidance for conducting this process. It is a guideline; unit or battle staff SOPs refine the process and the products prepared for specific divisions. Detailed analysis of the MDMF is outside the scope of this monograph.

¹³LTC Gene C. Kamena, "The Dying Art of Battle Rhythm," CTC Quarterly Bulletin, 1st Qtr, FY99, no. 99-3 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Training and Doctrine Command, Center for Army Lessons Learned, January 1999) [document on-line]; available from <http://call.army.mil/call/trngqtr/tq3-99/kamena.htm>; Internet; accessed 30

August 1999. Although his focus is on the battalion task force during CTC rotations, he addresses continuous combat operations and issues that are relevant for any tactical staff.

¹⁴This was a point made in a discussion during the AMSP exercise in September 1999. Additionally, LTC Kamena makes the same point when he writes that battle rhythm helps "focus leadership at critical points in the fight and during particular events." Kamena, "The Dying Art of Battle Rhythm," 2.

¹⁵Department of the Army, FM 60-20-10, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Targeting Process (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1990), 1-3. The entire manual details each step of the process, as does FM 71-100-1, Armored and Mechanized Division TTP, 5-93 – 5-109. The September 1999 AMSP exercise highlighted the planners' role in the division-level targeting meeting.

¹⁶FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations, 1-1. FM 71-100, Division Operations, 8-1.

¹⁷Thomas Donnelly, Margaret Roth, and Caleb Baker, Operation Just Cause: The Storming of Panama (New York, NY: Lexington Books, 1991), 393-394. Although the authors do not provide specific battle staff lessons learned, they do cite the SAMS program as a reason for success in planning for Operation JUST CAUSE. The program provided participating planners a common frame of reference, mutual trust, and acceptance by several diverse units.

¹⁸Operational in this context does not refer to an environment between the strategic and the tactical environments, as it does in some briefings on the mission in Bosnia. It simply refers to the overall conditions under which US forces worked in Bosnia.

¹⁹FM 100-5, Operations, 13-0 through 13-1. FM 71-100, Division Operations, 8-1.

²⁰Department of the Army, FM 100-23, Peace Operations (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1994), 6, 12.

²¹NATO conducted air strikes in May against Bosnian Serb bunkers to enforce the heavy weapons exclusion zone, and the Bosnian Serbs retaliated by taking UN hostages. In June, the Bosnian government army launched an unsuccessful offensive to free Sarajevo. The Bosnian Serbs overran the UN-established safe havens of Srebrenica and Zepa and threatened Gorazde. NATO air strikes intensified in August in an effort to force compliance with the exclusion zone around Sarajevo. In the meantime, the Croatian Army had conducted two successful offensives to reclaim lost territory. These events created an environment in which the parties were amenable to negotiating for peace. 18 Intelligence & Security Section, 1 MI Bn, The Rat, ARRC Special Edition (BFPO, United Kingdom: HQ ACE Rapid Reaction Corps, January 1996), 5.

²²Noel Malcolm's Bosnia: A Short History provides a good general history of Bosnia, especially in the context of the Ottoman Empire and Tito's Yugoslavia. Noel Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History, new, updated ed. (New York: New York University Press, 1996.) Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation provides a more detailed recent history of the conflict, examining the politics and personalities of Yugoslavia to explain its disintegration. This is an important work in understanding the context of the NATO mission and its potential for ultimate success. Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation, revised and updated ed. (New York: Penguin Books, 1997). Warren Zimmermann, the last US ambassador to Yugoslavia and Richard Holbrooke, diplomat and architect of the Dayton Peace Accords, also wrote books that provide important personal perspectives on the situation and on the personalities. Richard Holbrooke, To End a War (New York: Random House, 1998). Warren Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe (New York: Times Books, 1996).

²³"History of the NATO-led SFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina," 1.

²⁴During an assignment to the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) at Hohenfels, Germany, the author participated in most of the training that occurred from 1996 through June 1998 for the mission in Bosnia. This included Mountain Eagle mission rehearsal exercises (MRE) for deploying units and Individual Replacement Training (IRT) for individual soldiers deploying. The author conducted well over a hundred country overview briefings and participated in building or driving the scenario for several MRE. The research and discussion conducted for those briefings and for the background for each Mountain Eagle are the basis for much of this chapter. Kathleen A. Phillips, "Bosnia-Herzegovina Country Overview," (briefing presented and modified for Individual Replacement Training, 1996-1998); author's notes from Mountain Eagle series of exercises, 1996-1998.

The Dayton Proximity Talks resulted in the signing of a General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP) for Bosnia-Herzegovina. When referring to the authority to conduct operations like weapons storage site inspections or confiscation of weapons, it is more appropriate to refer to the GFAP than to the Dayton Peace Accords (DPA). The GFAP's Annex 1A, Military Aspects of the Peace Settlement, specifies the terms that the signatories agreed to and specifies that IFOR "will have the right to monitor and help ensure compliance." "The General Framework Agreement for Peace," 30 November 1995 [document on-line]; available from <http://www.nato.int/ifor/gfa/gfa-home.htm>; Internet; accessed 22 January 1997.

In his monograph "Planning the Peace," Kenneth McCreedy concludes that postconflict planning—SASO—should be an integral part of combat operations planning. The war in Bosnia was not ours to fight, so the US became directly involved in planning the peace separate from the war. McCreedy's monograph, however, offers good insights for planning that this author will address in later chapters. Kenneth O. McCreedy, "Planning the Peace," (SAMS Monograph, Advanced Military Studies Program, Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, Spring 1995), 45-46.

²⁵FM 100-23, Peace Operations, 87; "History of the NATO-led SFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina," 1.

²⁶"The General Framework Agreement for Peace," 2-3.

²⁷William B. Buchanan et al., Operation Joint Endeavor: Description and Lessons Learned (Implementation, Transition, and Redeployment Phases) (Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, July 1997), I-9. This report details some of the tasks TFE conducted as part of routine implementation of the GFAP. It also makes a good point about the force protection requirements that tasked a considerable number of TFE soldiers. The Joint Military Commission handbooks provide good soldier-level guidance for conducting compliance operations and force protection measures. JMC Handbook, 2nd ed.; JMC Handbook, 3rd ed.; JMC Handbook, 5th ed.; JMC Handbook, 6th ed.

²⁸Progress was very slow on the civil aspects of the peace agreement, which comprise ten of the eleven annexes of the GFAP. Key failures were the lack of large scale refugee returns, the lack of real freedom of movement, war criminals still at large, and the country still politically divided. President Clinton announced in November 1996 that US troops would be in Bosnia as late as June 1998. Buchanan, 4, I-11, VI-3 through VI-4.

²⁹Bosnia Peace Operation, GAO Report, 6-8.

³⁰Author's notes from Mountain Eagle Mission Rehearsal Exercises.

³¹FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations, 4-15.

³²FM 100-5, Operations, 13-2 through 13-3.

³³Task Force Eagle's series of Joint Military Commission (JMC) handbooks provide policies and procedures for implementing the provisions of the GFAP, as well as key information about the organizations with which US soldiers routinely come in contact. JMC Handbook, 2nd ed.; JMC Handbook, 3rd ed.; JMC Handbook, 5th ed.; JMC Handbook, 6th ed.

³⁴Fred Johnson, "Responding to Civil Disturbances in Bosnia," News From the Front, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, September-October 1996, 18-19.

³⁵David A. Lange, "The Role of the Political Advisor in Peacekeeping Operations," Parameters 29, no. 1 (Spring 1999): 93-95.

³⁶Department of the Army, FM 100-7, Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1995), 8-18.

³⁷McCreedy, "Planning the Peace," 47. McCreedy's monograph said that "a clear statement of end state from the NCA aids planning, but is neither imperative or likely." It then provided a good discussion about the evolution of an end state that can result from military input, an area this monograph will explore in a later chapter.

³⁸FM 100-5, Operations, 6-1, FM 100-7, Decisive Force, 8-18.

³⁹Buchanan, IV-20.

⁴⁰Ibid., IV-3.

⁴¹Stanley F. Cherrie, former Assistant Division Commander (Maneuver) for 1st Armor Division, interview by author, 25 October 1999, written notes, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The tiers refer to the way TFE Headquarters was established for Bosnia. The division set up a series of tables and chairs in a semicircle, some with computers and microphones, on tiered platforms to create a bandstand arrangement within the division main headquarters. The commander sat in front, facing the two large screens that the staff used to present briefings and tracking charts. The staff positions were behind him as previously described. BG Cherrie explained the command post set-up during the author's interview, and LTC Michael D. Jones, Commander of 2-67 Armor Battalion, described seeing a similar arrangement when he visited the division's command post in garrison prior to the division's deployment to Bosnia. Michael D. Jones, "The "Iron Dukes" Supporting Operation Joint Endeavor, in Warriors in Peace Operations, ed. Douglas V. Johnson, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1999), 99. The author visited Bosnia in May 1996 and saw this tiered arrangement established in a large fest tent at the back of the TFE Headquarters building in Tuzla.

⁴²Wood, Bob, "What They Never Told You at Fort Leavenworth about PSO," Slide packet compiled by BG Bob Wood, former Assistant Division Commander, 1st Armor Division, provided to author by Stanley F. Cherrie, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 25 October 1999, slide 9. BG Wood had also served as the Chief of Staff, 1st Infantry Division, during SFOR1. Non-lethal fires impair, disrupt, or delay the enemy instead of directly destroying him. Options to accomplish this include psychological operations, special operations forces, electronic warfare, and command and control countermeasures. FM 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Graphics, 1-110.

⁴³Stanley F. Cherrie, "Task Force Eagle," Military Review 77, no. 4 (Jul-Aug 97): 65.

⁴⁴Arthur Tulak, "Psyop C2W Information Operations (IO) in Bosnia," News From the Front (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, November-December 1998), 30.

⁴⁵Buchanan, IV-2. Bosnia also signaled the Army's recognition that IO is a major contributor to military operations at all levels. Lieutenant Colonel Stephen W. Shanahan

and Lieutenant Colonel Garry J. Beavers, "Information Operations in Bosnia," Military Review (November-December 1997), 62.

⁴⁶Tulak, "Psyop C2W IO in Bosnia," 30-31.

⁴⁷Cherrie, interview.

⁴⁸Shanahan, 53. The Department of the Army established the LIWA in 1995 to assist land component commanders plan, coordinate, and execute information operations in joint and multinational environments. FM 100-6, Information Operations, 6-7. Bosnia was the LIWA's first multinational peace enforcement operation, and there are a multitude of lessons learned and TTP that brigades and battalions developed. Shanahan, 54.

⁴⁹Video Teleconference between 1st Cavalry Division and Advanced Military Studies Program students, summer 1999.

⁵⁰Brian Gates, former Division Collection Manager for 1st Infantry Division, interview by author, 25 October 1999, email exchange, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, B/H CAAT 2 Initial Impressions Report: Task Force Eagle Continuing Operations, Operation Joint Endeavor (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, September 1996), 29.

⁵¹Cherrie, interview. There are a number of lessons learned and after action reports on the integration of special staff officers—CA, PSYOP, and CI, especially—into brigade and battalion staffs for the mission in Bosnia. The discussions of division level staff operations are much more sparse.

⁵²Buchanan, 11-12; IV-4 through IV-5; US Special Operations Command History, 2nd ed. (MacDill AFB, FL: HQ USSOCOM/SOCS-HQ, History and Research Office, September 1998), 55. Some NGOs would object to the suggestion that their efforts required any coordination by military personnel.

⁵³Cherrie, interview. Although the division provided broad guidance for CA—and for PSYOP—work in the TFE sector, the work was not always well-coordinated. The next chapter discusses the planning structures within TFE staffs. While these structures worked to coordinate and synchronize the efforts of various agencies like CA, PSYOP, PA, and intelligence, some of the structures above the division hindered the process.

⁵⁴*Ibid.*

⁵⁵Tulak, 31.

⁵⁶James C. Boisselle, "Tactical PSYOPS: Supporting the Infantry Brigade and Battalion," Infantry 86, no. 5 (September-October 1996), 17.

⁵⁷Buchanan, IV-13 through IV-14.

⁵⁸Special Operations Command History, 55.

⁵⁹Boisselle, 15.

⁶⁰Curtis M. Scaparotti, "The Blue Falcons in Bosnia," in Johnson, Warriors in Peace Operations, 48.

⁶¹Buchanan, V-37. Also, BG Cherrie highlights the importance of the military interaction with the media in his discussion of pre-deployment training and his comment about getting media operations into high gear. Cherrie, 64, 68. LTC Jeffrey W. Hammond, former Commander of 4-29 Field Artillery Battalion, likewise discusses the emphasis put on media training in his monograph. Jeffrey W. Hammond, "Commanding a FA Bn in a Peace Enforcement Environment—Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR," in Johnson, 122. The author can attest to the emphasis media awareness received during Individual Replacement Training and during mission rehearsal exercises at CMTC.

⁶²Buchanan, V-37.

⁶³Ibid.

⁶⁴Arthur Tulak, "Information Operations in Support of Demonstrations and Shows of Force," News From the Front (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, November- December 1998), 15.

⁶⁵Mark Dickens, "Task Force Eagle: Assault Command Post," News From the Front (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, May-June 1996), 22-23.

⁶⁶Tulak, 30.

⁶⁷Shanahan, 61-62. This recommendation is controversial, and may not represent progress for the staff. An officer who worked on one TFE staff said his Chief of Staff would not have had the time to take on this role. In a discussion on October 22, 1999 with MAJ Chuck Eassa, a current AMSP student and designated IO officer, he said that division staffs will start to see IO officers assigned to them in December 1999. He expressed concern that although they were being assigned in accordance with the Force XXI and career field designator changes, the staffs receiving them may not employ them as IO officers. One perception is that if the IO officer works for the Chief of Staff, he would be able to focus on IO, but that if he works for the G3, he would become just another staff officer sharing the burden of a multitude of tasks.

⁶⁸Wood, 5.

⁶⁹Lange, 97. Lange identified levels of operation and tasks as a model for a POLAD, a position he considered critical to a mission like Bosnia. In his lead into the article, as well as in an explanatory note, Lange discusses the debate that surrounded NATO leadership's decision to provide a POLAD for the Commander of IFOR. The tension between civilian control and military flexibility was central to the debate. Lange, 92-93.

⁷⁰Lange, 109, 96, 103. Gates, interview.

⁷¹Lange, 103, 105.

⁷²One division G2 officer told the author that everything in Bosnia was tied to political agendas, and that each ethnic group was good at manipulation to justify its work towards their agenda. Resettlement, for example, was not simply a matter of reclaiming lost property, but also a way of regaining territory lost in the war for the ethnic group; it did not matter that such actions were construed as GFAP violations.

⁷³Lange, 107, Gates, interview.

⁷⁴Lange, 103, 108.

⁷⁵Cherrie, interview.

⁷⁶McCreedy, 37-38.

⁷⁷Larry Wentz, ed., *Lessons from Bosnia: The IFOR Experience* (Washington, DC: National Strategic Studies Institute, 1997), 33.

⁷⁸Command and control studies on Bosnia discuss the information management challenges TFE staffs encountered. BG Cherrie said there was far more information to track in the Bosnian peace enforcement operation than in most combat operations. As examples, he cited the need to track the flow of deploying units, the status of the bridge being built, treaty compliance measures, hot spots, faction movement, mine strike incidents, route status, and undisciplined firing incidents. Cherrie, interview, Cherrie, "Task Force Eagle," 69-70. The 1st Armor Division Assault Command Post, operational from December 20, 1995 to January 18, 1996 had no plans cell—planning was done in the rear in Germany—but it established unique methods of tracking all of this information. Dickens, 19-20. Added to the quantity of information is the multinational character of the operation. BG Wood echoed this theme when he said that "there is no word in Finnish, Turkish, or Russian for synchronize." He cautioned that diplomacy was necessary to overcome the potential misunderstandings. Wood, 4, 6.

⁷⁹"Combat Maneuver Training Center Stability Operations Lessons Learned"

(Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, January 1996) [CALL Restricted Database]; available from [http://160.149.150.44/cgi-bin/cqcggi/@de c...E\[Show_Doc1\]=TRUE&CQ_RESULTS_DOC_TEXT=YES;](http://160.149.150.44/cgi-bin/cqcggi/@de c...E[Show_Doc1]=TRUE&CQ_RESULTS_DOC_TEXT=YES;) Internet; accessed 17 October 1999.

⁸⁰The Zvornik Seven incident involved seven Muslims who surrendered to IFOR soldiers, allegedly to avoid capture and harassment by Bosnian Serbs. There was controversy about their alleged criminal acts and the status of their weapons. The soldiers turned the men over to Bosnian Serb authorities, prompting outrage and international concern for their welfare. The soldiers had acted as they deemed correct in accordance with the provisions of the GFAP; law enforcement was the responsibility of the parties. Jeffery W. Hammond, "Commanding a Field Artillery Battalion in a Peace Enforcement Environment—Operation Joint Endeavor," in Johnson, Warriors in Peace Operations, 145-146.

⁸¹One officer who served on a TFE planning staff thought the merged staffs created more confusion than efficient planning.

⁸²Richard Piscal, former S3, 2nd Armor Cavalry Regiment, interview by author, 13 November 1999, email exchange, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

⁸³The JMC is also both a structure and a process. The process as it relates to division level planning is discussed in the next chapter.

⁸⁴Cherrie, interview. Cherrie, "Task Force Eagle," 71.

⁸⁵Hank Stratman, Peter Durrant, Kevin Govern, Dave Gaumer, Robert Murphy, and Fred Johnson, Center for Army Lessons Learned Newsletter No. 96-8: Joint Military Commissions (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, September 1996), I-1.

⁸⁶Cherrie, interview.

⁸⁷Stratman et al., I-4.

⁸⁸Video Teleconference between 1st Cavalry Division and Advanced Military Studies Program students, summer 1999.

⁸⁹Grange, David L. "Setting the Stage: Peacekeeping Operations Demand Unconventional Military Approaches." Armed Forces Journal International (March 1998): 44-45.

⁹⁰US TRADOC, B/H CAAT 2 Initial Impressions, 29.

⁹¹Gates, interview. Several references on information operations emphasize the long lead time required for planning IO operations and then for assessing their impact.

Two officers with staff experience in Bosnia who spoke to AMSP students in November 1999 echoed this theme during their briefing on strategic IO. This poses a challenge to division planners and commanders; they must accept the importance of IO to division operations and request IO augmentation early enough to influence the first operations.

⁹²Wentz, 410.

⁹³Department of the Army, FM 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1994), 1-7 through 1-8; George K. Gramer, Jr, "Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR: Combined-Joint Intelligence in Peace Enforcement Operations," Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin 22, no. 4 (October-December 1996): 14. LTC Gramer served as a watch briefer and intelligence director on the CJ2 staff, HQ, IFOR in Sarajevo. His article discussed intelligence architecture at higher levels and the fact that many of the intelligence requirements at that level were non-military. The reference issue of MIPB was devoted to intelligence operations in Bosnia, and CALL has a number of documents that highlight intelligence operations in Bosnia. There were a multitude of intelligence innovations and lessons learned from Bosnia.

⁹⁴Gates, interview. Additionally, the author's visit to TFE in May 1997 emphasized a review of TFE intelligence structures and procedures.

⁹⁵David D. Perkins, "Counterintelligence and HUMINT," in Wentz 238-240.

⁹⁶This should not detract from the value of battalion scouts, a form of HUMINT and a key source of intelligence at the battalion level. Wentz, 116.

⁹⁷Gramer, 13; VTC with 1st Cav Div.

⁹⁸Wentz, 108, 114.

⁹⁹Lange, 93-94.

¹⁰⁰William L. Nash, "The Year of Living Creatively," Armed Forces Journal International (November 1997): 38, 42-43. The article reflected MG Nash's observations after serving as the first commander of Task Force Eagle.

¹⁰¹Cherrie, interview.

¹⁰²Piscal, interview; VTC with 1st Cav Div.

¹⁰³Wentz, 37-38.

¹⁰⁴Steven Collins, "Army PSYOP in Bosnia: Capabilities and Constraints." Parameters 29, no. 2 (Summer 1999): 64.

¹⁰⁵The CALL cell and other after action reports and studies contain a multitude of lessons learned about peace enforcement operations tactics, techniques, and procedures at battalion and below. Examples include the concepts of inner and outer ring; the IDAM (isolate, dominate, maintain situational awareness, employ multidimensional, multiechelon actions) methodology for handling civil disturbances; how to conduct a weapons storage site inspection and a JMC; and the use of the graduated response matrix and the rules of engagement. There are not a lot of documented lessons learned about staff operations, especially at the division level.

¹⁰⁶The multination dimension of TFE decreases planning effectiveness since translating and clarifying missions and intent are time-consuming. Cherrie, interview.

¹⁰⁷Michael D. Jones, "The "Iron Dukes" Supporting Operation Joint Endeavor," in Johnson, Warriors in Peace Operations, 107, 116.

¹⁰⁸Wood, 8-9. This is not to suggest that combat is not real or vital, but that most units have more experience in simulated combat where the consequences are less severe.

¹⁰⁹The Brcko Arbitration was a decision regarding the status of Brcko, a city with strategic and emotional significance in the Posavina Corridor in northern Bosnia. Prior to the war, it had been a predominantly Muslim town, but it was the site of many atrocities during the war. By the summer of 1995, Brcko was predominantly Serb. The city's strategic significance lies in its transportation hubs that provide access to western Europe and in its location at the narrowest point of the Republika Srpska, the Bosnian Serb entity. The Dayton Accord did not settle the issue of ownership of the town, instead putting the decision in the hands of a small arbitration committee. TFE expected emotional reactions and potential violence to accompany the announcement of the decision, and planned accordingly. Author's training notes.

¹¹⁰VTC with 1st Cav Div; former TFE Deputy G3 discussion with AMSP students during the fall of 1999; Grange, 44-45. EAF is the term for the military forces of each Bosnian ethnic group. This substructure and its impact on Bosnia and GFAP compliance highlight the foundation for the G2's comment about everything being linked to political agendas and manipulation in note 72.

¹¹¹Cherrie, interview; former TFE Deputy G3 discussion with AMSP students during the fall of 1999; Piscal, interview. Giving the process more credibility is an article about joint planning, which describes a process very similar to the MDMP: mission analysis, COA development and selection, OPLAN/OPORD development, and three key briefings that included a mission analysis briefing, a COA approval briefing, and a plan/order approval briefing. The author also discussed linking plans and operations cycles and parallel planning. Gordon Wells, "Sample JTF Planning Briefings: First Step Toward Developing a JTF "Battle Rhythm," News From the Front (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, September-October 1996), 1-15.

¹¹²Cherrie, interview. Other events that played a role in the TFE planning effort—JMC planning conferences, JMC information briefings, and POLAD briefings—were also part of the battle rhythm. “Liaison Officer (LO) Procedures and Responsibilities.” News From the Front (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, May-June 1996), 6. Some reports of battle staff operations indicate that battalion level staffs seemed to have lost their edge and proficiency at MDMP for combat operations after a tour in Bosnia. Among the reasons suggested were the restrictions imposed by the Graduated Response Matrix and the Rules of Engagement, the limited number of potential courses of action, and the availability of combat multipliers from brigade and division. Wargaming and command and control were affected. In combat, battalions control the maneuver of several diverse subordinate commands simultaneously over a large and probably unfamiliar area. This was not the case in Bosnia. Louis B. Rago, “Putting the Tactical Back in the TOC,” Center for Army Lessons Learned Newsletter No. 98-11: Stability and Support Operations (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, April 1998), 22-24. Although TFE divisions operated under similar constraints, this same criticism does not seem applicable to the division level. The difference may be in the fact that battalions tend not to have the resources to have a planning staff that is entirely distinct from its operations staff. The division planning staffs had challenges of a different magnitude.

¹¹³“Military Decision-Making Process,” in Stabilization Force Planning Process (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, January 1999) [CALL Restricted Database]; available from [http://160.149.150.44/cgi-bin/cqcgi/@de_call_8773.env?CQ_SESSION_KEY=THIUSGCGZREJ&CQ_CUR_DOCUMENT=6&CQ_SAVE\[Show_Doc1\]=TRUE&CQ_RESULTS_DOC_TEXT=YES](http://160.149.150.44/cgi-bin/cqcgi/@de_call_8773.env?CQ_SESSION_KEY=THIUSGCGZREJ&CQ_CUR_DOCUMENT=6&CQ_SAVE[Show_Doc1]=TRUE&CQ_RESULTS_DOC_TEXT=YES); accessed 26 October 1999. A related document provided planning considerations that are particularly relevant for the peace enforcement environment. These included rules of engagement, use of force considerations, mediation and negotiation, crowd control training, force protection, and traffic control points. “Planning Considerations,” in Stabilization Force Planning Process (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, January 1999) [CALL Restricted Database]; available from [http://160.149.150.44/cgi-bin/cqcgi/@de_call_8773.env?CQ_SESSION_KEY=THIUSGCGZREJ&CQ_CUR_DOCUMENT=11&CQ_SAVE\[Show_Doc1\]=TRUE&CQ_RESULTS_DOC_TEXT=YES](http://160.149.150.44/cgi-bin/cqcgi/@de_call_8773.env?CQ_SESSION_KEY=THIUSGCGZREJ&CQ_CUR_DOCUMENT=11&CQ_SAVE[Show_Doc1]=TRUE&CQ_RESULTS_DOC_TEXT=YES); accessed 26 October 1999.

¹¹⁴Bosnia-Herzegovina After Action Review (BHAAR I) (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army Peacekeeping Institute, 1996) [document on-line]; available from http://www.eucom.smil.mi/eccs-as/library...ration_joint_endeavour/aar/aar_bh_1.html; Internet; accessed 28 July 1999.

¹¹⁵Robinson, Joe. “The “Slinky Effect” in Bosnia During the 1st Infantry’s Tenure 1996-June 1997.” US Army War College Research Project. Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 1998, 15, 19-21. LTC Robinson dedicated several pages in his paper to explaining the doctrinal demand for a clear endstate. Robinson, 6-10. He also suggested with his conclusion that a new method of military planning might be

necessary for peace operations. He does not, however, offer any recommendations on how to do so. The prevailing thought of other staff officers and division leaders the author encountered in research is that the current MDMP—with greater consideration of CI, HUMINT input, a better appreciation of political, diplomatic, and economic factors, and better utilization of non-lethal fires as courses of action—is the right process for any military operation.

¹¹⁶VTC with 1st Cav Div. During its second rotation as TFE headquarters, 1st Armor Division had a strategic planner—an officer on temporary change of station from West Point—and conducted weekly strategy meetings that the Chief of Staff chaired. The author found very little additional information regarding 1st Armor Division's strategic planning, but it is significant that each division that participated in SFOR recognized the need to do strategic planning.

¹¹⁷FM 100-7, Decisive Force, 8-4. Such characteristics may also include a non-linear battlefield, diverse threats that are difficult to track and target, weather, disease, and harassing fires tactics by belligerents.

¹¹⁸Shanahan, 55-56. Two officers who served in Bosnia and spoke to AMSP students in the fall of 1999 also discussed the creation of an IO vision, which influenced compliance and bubbled up to the division's higher headquarters. This input from the bottom up is a theme seen again in the strategic planning process for the division.

¹¹⁹Shanahan, 57-60; Gates, interview; VTC with 1st Cav Div. IO means included public announcements, print media, PSYOP broadcasts, hand bills, and radio spots. Shanahan's article provided a good series of tactics, techniques, and procedures for IO, with examples of some of the worksheets.

¹²⁰VTC with 1st Cav Div.

¹²¹This is drawn from a non-attribution discussion two planners had with AMSP students in the fall of 1999; from discussions with LTC Pete Schifferle, Exercise Director for AMSP; and from the author's interview with Major Richard Piscal.

¹²²Author's training notes from CMTC.

¹²³Jonathan White, former Joint Commission Officer, Task Force Eagle, discussion with author, 22 November 1999, email exchange, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Major White saw both extremes—very good and very poor—of JMC credibility. Major White also discussed the fact that the Bosnian military forces over time became less significant as players, since the military aspects of the GFAP were essentially accomplished. Extremists and hardliners, however, redirected the conflict into demonstrations, riots, sabotage, and intimidation. Although SFOR has been very successful in enforcing compliance with the military provisions of the GFAP, progress on the civil aspects remains slow and undermined by the redirected conflict, which SFOR is

capable of only marginally affecting. A planner with experience in Bosnia during SFOR who spoke to AMSP students during the fall of 1999 echoed this last concept.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS

- "General Framework Agreement for Peace." 30 November 1995. Document on-line. Available from http://www.nato.int/ifor/gfa_home.htm. Internet. Accessed 22 January 1997.
- Government Accounting Office. Bosnia Peace Operation: Mission, Structure, and Transition Strategy of NATO's Stabilization Force. Letter Report, GAO/NSIAD-99-19. Washington, DC: Government Accounting Office, 8 October 1998. Document on-line. Available from <http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/useftp.cgi?IpAddress=162.140.64.88&filename=/ga>. Internet. Accessed 7 September 1999.
- Government Accounting Office. Peace Operations: Update on the Situation in the Former Yugoslavia, Briefing Report to the Majority Leader, US Senate. Washington, DC: Government Accounting Office, 1995.
- Headquarters, US Special Operations Command. US Special Operations Command History, 2d ed. MacDill Air Force Base, FL: USSOCOM/SOCS-HO, History and Research Office, 1998.
- US, Department of the Army. ARTEP 100-2, Division Command Group and Staff. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1978.
- US, Department of the Army. FM 6-20-10, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for The Targeting Process. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1990.
- US, Department of the Army. FM 25-100, Training the Force. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1988.
- US, Department of the Army. FM 25-101, Battle Focused Training. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1990.
- US, Department of the Army. FM 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1994.
- US, Department of the Army. FM 34-60, Counterintelligence. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1990.
- US, Department of the Army. FM 71-100, Division Operations. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1996.

US, Department of the Army. FM 71-100-1, Armored and Mechanized Division Operations Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, Final Draft. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1993.

US, Department of the Army. FM 71-100-2, Infantry Division Operations Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1993.

US, Department of the Army. FM 100-5, Operations. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1993.

US, Department of the Army. FM 100-6, Information Operations. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1996.

US, Department of the Army. FM 100-7, Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1995.

US, Department of the Army. FM 100-23, Peace Operations. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1994.

US, Department of the Army. FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1997.

US, Department of the Army. FM 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Graphics. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1997.

US Department of Defense. Bosnia Country Handbook, December 1995.

US Department of Defense. Bosnia Country Handbook, May 1996.

US Department of Defense. Bosnia Country Handbook, February 1997.

AFTER ACTION REVIEWS, LESSONS LEARNED, AND STUDIES

Bosnia-Herzegovina After Action Review (BHAAR I). Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army Peacekeeping Institute, 1996. Document on-line. Available from Instihttp://www.eucom.smil.mil/eccs-as/library...ration_joint_endeavour/aar/aar_bh_1.html. Internet. Accessed 28 July 1999.

Buchanan, William B., Robert C. Holcomb, Martin A. Lidy, and Samuel H. Packer. Operation Joint Endeavor: Description and Lessons Learned (Implementation, Transition, and Reployment Phases.) Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, July 1997. Microfiche.

"Combat Maneuver Training Center Stability Operations Lessons Learned." Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, January 1996. CALL Restricted Database. Available from [http://160.149.150.44/cgi-bin/cqcggi/@de c...E\[Show Doc1\]=TRUE&CQ_RESULTS DOC TEXT=YES](http://160.149.150.44/cgi-bin/cqcggi/@de c...E[Show Doc1]=TRUE&CQ_RESULTS DOC TEXT=YES). Internet. Accessed 17 October 1999.

Dichairo, Joseph J. and Robert Brown. "Synchronization in Peace Operations." News From the Front. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, March-April 1996, 12-20.

Dickens, Mark. "Task Force Eagle: Assault Command Post." News From the Front. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, May-June 1996, 19-23.

Institute for Defense Analyses. Operation Joint Endeavor USEUCOM After Action Review, Vol I. Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, April 1997.

Johnson, Fred. "Responding to Civil Disturbances in Bosnia." News From the Front. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, September-October 1996, 18-22.

_____. "Synchronizing the Response to Civil Disturbances: Task Force Eagle's Staff Coordination." News From the Front. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, November-December 1996, 10-17.

Jones, Craig. "The Information Operations Process." News From the Front. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, March-April 1998, 1-9.

Kamena, Gene C. "The Dying Art of Battle Rhythm." CTC Quarterly Bulletin, 1st Qtr, FY99, no. 99-3. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Training and Doctrine Command, Center for Army Lessons Learned, January 1999. Document on-line. Available from <http://call.army.mil/call/trngqtr/tq3-99/kamena.htm>. Internet. Accessed 30 August 1999.

"Liaison Officer (LO) Procedures and Responsibilities." News From the Front. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, May-June 1996, 3-9.

Rago, Louis B. "Putting the Tactical Back in the TOC." Center for Army Lessons Learned Newsletter No. 98-11: Stability and Support Operations. Fort

Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, April 1998, 22-24.

"Maintaining Warfighting Skills." News From the Front. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, November-December 1996, 3-9.

Members of the Combat Maneuver Training Center. "Operation MOUNTAIN EAGLE Lessons – Stability Operations." News From the Front. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, March-April 1996, 1-9.

"Military Decision-Making Process." In Stabilization Force Planning Process. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, January 1999. CALL Restricted Database. Available from [http://160.149.150.44/cgi-bin/cqcggi/@de_call_8773.env?CQ_SESSION_KEY=THIUSGCGZREJ&CQ_CUR_DOCUMENT=6&CQ_SAVE\[Show_Doc1\]=TRUE&CQ_RESULTS_DOC_TEXT=YES](http://160.149.150.44/cgi-bin/cqcggi/@de_call_8773.env?CQ_SESSION_KEY=THIUSGCGZREJ&CQ_CUR_DOCUMENT=6&CQ_SAVE[Show_Doc1]=TRUE&CQ_RESULTS_DOC_TEXT=YES). Accessed 26 October 1999.

"Planning Considerations." In Stabilization Force Planning Process. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, January 1999. CALL Restricted Database. Available from [http://160.149.150.44/cgi-bin/cqcggi/@de_call_8773.env?CQ_SESSION_KEY=THIUSGCGZREJ&CQ_CUR_DOCUMENT=11&CQ_SAVE\[Show_Doc1\]=TRUE&CQ_RESULTS_DOC_TEXT=YES](http://160.149.150.44/cgi-bin/cqcggi/@de_call_8773.env?CQ_SESSION_KEY=THIUSGCGZREJ&CQ_CUR_DOCUMENT=11&CQ_SAVE[Show_Doc1]=TRUE&CQ_RESULTS_DOC_TEXT=YES). Accessed 26 October 1999.

Stratman, Hank, Peter Durrant, Kevin Govern, Dave Gaumer, Robert Murphy, and Fred Johnson. Center for Army Lessons Learned Newsletter No. 96-8: Joint Military Commissions. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, September 1996.

Tulak, Arthur. "Information Operations in Support of Demonstrations and Shows of Force." News From the Front. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, November- December 1998, 15-17.

_____. "Psyop C2W Information Operations (IO) in Bosnia." News From the Front. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, November-December 1998, 30-33.

US Army Training and Doctrine Command. Initial Impressions Report: Task Force Eagle Initial Operations, Operation Joint Endeavor. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, May 1996.

US Army Training and Doctrine Command. B/H CAAT 2 Initial Impressions Report: Task Force Eagle Continuing Operations, Operation Joint Endeavor. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, September 1996.

US Army USAREUR. Operation Joint Endeavor: USAREUR Headquarters After

Action Report. Heidelberg, GE: US Army Europe, May 1997.

Wells, Gordon. "Sample JTF Planning Briefings: First Step Toward Developing a JTF "Battle Rhythm." News From the Front. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, September-October 1996, 1-15.

18 Military Intelligence and Security Section, 1 MI Bn. The Rat, ARRC Special Edition. BFPO, United Kingdom: Headquarters, Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps, January 1996.

INTERVIEWS AND DISCUSSIONS

Cherrie, Stanley F., former Assistant Division Commander (Maneuver) for 1st Armor Division. Interview by author, 25 October 1999. Written notes. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Donovan, Tom, Chief of Plans, 82 Airborne Division. Telephone conversation with author, 12 October 1999. Written notes. Leavenworth, Kansas.

Fontenot, Gregory. "Peace Enforcing: Never Let Them See You Sweat." Interview by Patrecia Slayden Hollis. Field Artillery (January-February 1997): 5-8.

Gates, Brian, former Division Collection Manager for 1st Infantry Division. Interview by author, 25 October 1999. Email exchange. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Nash, William L. "Task Force Eagle in Operation Joint Endeavor—Lessons Learned In Peace Enforcing." Interview by Patrecia Slayden Hollis. Field Artillery (January-February 1997): 5-8.

Piscal, Richaard, former S3, 2nd Armor Cavalry Regiment. Interview by author, 13 November 1999. Email exchange. Leavenworth, Kansas.

White, Jonathan, former Joint Commission Officer, Task Force Eagle. Discussion with Author, 22 November 1999. Email exchange. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Zahner, Richard P, G2, XVIII Airborne Corps. Discussion with author, 11 September 1999. Written notes. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

UNPUBLISHED DISSERTATIONS, THESES, MONOGRAPHS, STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURES, BRIEFINGS, NOTES, AND VTC TAPES

Gouthro, Gerard Alexander. "Peacekeeping When There is no Peace to Keep." MA

-
- Thesis. St. John's, Newfoundland: Memorial University of Newfoundland, 1995.
- Joint Military Commission Policies, Procedures, and Command Guidance Handbook, 2nd ed. Tuzla, Bosnia: Task Force Eagle Joint Military Commission, 12 May 1996.
- Joint Military Commission Policies, Procedures, and Command Guidance Handbook, 3rd ed. Tuzla, Bosnia: Task Force Eagle Joint Military Commission, 20 October 1996.
- Joint Military Commission Policies, Procedures, and Command Guidance Handbook, 5th ed. Tuzla, Bosnia: Multinational Division (North) Joint Military Commission, 9 July 1997.
- Joint Military Commission Policies, Procedures, and Command Guidance Handbook, 6th ed. Tuzla, Bosnia: Multinational Division (North) Joint Military Commission, 12 January 1998.
- McCreedy, Kenneth O. "Planning the Peace: Operation Eclipse and the Occupation of Germany." MMAS Monograph. Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, USACGSC, 1995.
- Phillips, Kathleen A. "Bosnia-Herzegovina Country Overview." Briefing presented and modified for Individual Replacement Training at the Combat Maneuver Training Center, Hohenfels, Germany, 1996-1998. Author's notes from Mountain Eagle series of exercises, 1996-1998.
- Schifferle, Peter. "Division Battle Staff." Briefing to AMSP class. Author's notes. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, August 1999.
- Schifferle, Peter. "Military Decision Making Process." Briefing to AMSP class. Author's notes. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, September 1999.
- "Task Force Eagle Mission Briefing, November 26, 1996". Slide packet provided to author by Stanley F. Cherrie. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 25 October 1999.
- USAREUR 40104X Campaign Plan, Newcomers' Orientation. Briefing to the new team. 10 November 1995. On Planners' Toolbox. CD-ROM. Fort Leavenworth, KS: AMSP, Summer 1999.
- Video Teleconference between 1st Cavalry Division and Advanced Military Studies Program students, Summer 1999.
- Wood, Bob. "What They Never Told You at Fort Leavenworth about PSO." Slide packet compiled by BG Bob Wood, former Assistant Division Commander, 1st Armor Division, provided to author by Stanley F. Cherrie. Fort Leavenworth,

Kansas, 25 October 1999.

1st Armor Division, Field Standing Operating Procedures (FSOP). APO AE 09252:

1st Armor Division, 1998.

1st Cavalry Division, Tactical Standing Operating Procedures (TACSOP). Fort Hood,

TX: 1st Cavalry Division, 13 March 1995.

1st Infantry Division. Standing Operating Procedures (SOP). APO AE 09036: 1st

Infantry Division, 20 April 1998.

3rd Infantry Division. 3ID Command Estimate Handbook. On Planner's Toolbox.

CD-ROM. Fort Leavenworth, KS: AMSP, Summer 1999.

BOOKS

Bert, Wayne. The Reluctant Superpower: United States Policy in Bosnia, 1991-1995.

New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997.

Blank, Steven, William T. Johnsen, and Earl H. Tilford, Jr. US Policy in the Balkans: A

Hobson's Choice. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1995.

Donnelly, Thomas, Margaret Roth, and Caleb Baker. Operation JUST CAUSE: The

Storming of Panama. New York, NY: Lexington Books, 1991.

Durch, William J., ed. UN Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of the

1990s. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996.

Higham, Matthew T., Michael N. Mercurio, and Steven W. Ghezzi, eds. The ACCESS

Issue Packet on Bosnia-Herzegovina. Washington, DC: ACCESS, 1996.

Holbrooke, Richard. To End a War. New York: Random House, 1998.

Johnsen, William T. Deciphering the Balkan Enigma: Using History to Inform Policy.

Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1993.

Johnsen, William T. US Participation in IFOR: A Marathon, Not a Sprint. Carlisle

Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1996.

Johnson, Douglas V., ed. Warriors in Peace Operations. Carlisle Barracks, PA:

Strategic Studies Institute, 1999.

Malcolm, Noel. Bosnia: A Short History, new, updated ed. New York: New York

University Press, 1996.

Owen, David. Balkan Odyssey. New York: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1995.

Quinn, Dennis J., ed. Peace Support Operations and the US Military. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1994.

Siegec, Pascale Combelles. Target Bosnia: Integrating Information Activities in Peace Operations. Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1998.

Silber, Laura and Allan Little. Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation, revised and updated ed. New York: Penguin Books, 1997.

Sloan, Elinor C. Bosnia and the New Collective Security. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1998.

Tindemans, Leo, Lloyd Cutler, Bronislaw Geremsk, John Roper, Theo Summer, and Simone Veil. Unfinished Peace: Report of the International Commission on the Balkans. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1996.

Wentz, Larry, ed. Lessons from Bosnia: The IFOR Experience. Washington, DC: National Strategic Studies Institute, 1997.

Woodward, Susan L. Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1995.

Zimmermann, Warren. Origins of a Catastrophe. New York: Times Books, 1996.

ARTICLES

Boisselle, James C. "Tactical PSYOPS: Supporting the Infantry Brigade and Battalion." Infantry 86, no. 5 (September-October 1996): 14-17.

Bunker, Robert J. "Rethinking OOTW." Military Review 75, no. 6 (November-December 1995): 35-41.

Cherrie, Stanley F. "TF Eagle." Military Review 77, no. 4 (July-August 1997): 63-72.

Cirafici, John L. "SFOR in Bosnia in 1997: A Watershed Year." Parameters 29, no. 1 (Spring 1999): 80-91.

Collins, Steven. "Army PSYOP in Bosnia: Capabilities and Constraints." Parameters 29, No. 2 (Summer 1999): 57-73.

-
- Cucolo, Tony. "Grunt Diplomacy: In the Beginning There Were Only Soldiers." Parameters 29, no. 1 (Spring 1999): 110-126.
- Gramer, George K, Jr. "Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR: Combined-Joint Intelligence in Peace Enforcement Operations." Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin 22, No. 4 (October-December 1996): 11-14.
- Grange, David L. "Setting the Stage: Peacekeeping Operations Demand Unconventional Military Approaches." Armed Forces Journal International (March 1998): 44-45.
- Gavle, Kathleen A. "Mission Rehearsal at CMTC: Operations Joint Endeavor and Joint Guard." Military Intelligence 24, no.2 (April-June 1998): 33-37.
- "History of the NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina." 16 November 1998. Document on-line. Available from <http://www.nato.int/sfor/docu/d981116a.htm>. Internet. Accessed 12 September 1999.
- Hunt, John B. "OOTW: A Concept in Flux." Military Review 76, no. 5 (September-October 1996): 3-9.
- Killebrew, Robert B. "Deterrence with a Vengeance: Combat Infantrymen Remain Best Choice for PEO." Armed Forces Journal International (October 1998): 76-81.
- Lange, David A. "The Role of the Political Advisor in Peacekeeping Operations." Parameters 29, no. 1 (Spring 1999): 92-109.
- Manwaring, Max G. "Peace and Stability Lessons from Bosnia." Parameters 28, no. 4 (Winter 1998-1999): 28-38.
- Nash, William L. "The Year of Living Creatively." Armed Forces Journal International (November 1997): 38-43.
- Rota, Dane L. "Combat Decisionmaking in Operations Other Than War." Military Review 76, no. 2 (March-April 1996): 24-28.
- Shanahan, Stephen W. and Garry J. Beavers. "Information Operations in Bosnia." Military Review (November-December 1997): 53-62.